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Foreword

SLEEP-WALKING INTO DISASTER.
This is a sequel to a pamphlet, entitled Turning Point Toward
Peace, written in the summer of 1955 shortly after the "Summit
Meeting" at Geneva. The purpose of that pamphlet was to arouse
American awareness of the dangers and opportunities presented
by a changed and rapidly changing world and to bring the basic
issues of American foreign policy into the forefront of discussion
in an election year.
During the past twelve months, the dangers have multiplied
while the opportunities have diminished. The Genevi meeting
still appears in retrospect as a probable turning point toward peace,
but peace now threatens to mean for Western civilization something only a little less catastrophic than a war of extinction; namely,
defeat without war.
It is now often said that Geneva accomplished nothing. This
is true only in the sense that no outstanding differences were there
resolved. But, while the Big Four meeting may not have accomplished anything, it changed everything. It marked the end of
one era in which physical force had been the essential instrument
of national policy and the beginning of a new era in which national
aims would have to be pursued by persuasion rather than by power.
The communist leaders have been quicker to grasp the
significance of this change than the Western statesmen. Therein
lies the mounting danger.
For the past twelve months, American foreign policy has
stagnated. Up to the time of the nominating conventions of
August, 1956, there has been no serious discussion of the basic
issues. In the face of the rapidly accumulating evidence of the
bankruptcy of its foreign policy, a Republican administration has
boasted of imaginary triumphs and successes, standing pat upon
obsolete concepts inherited from its Democratic predecessor. The
Democratic opposition has been tongue-tied and brain-paralyzed
by the knowledge that this bankrupt policy was initiated by a
Democratic President, forgetting that in the meanwhile the world
had undergone a radical change.
As the result of bipartisan avoidance of basic issues, t hw
e
opportunities for public education offered by an election year-have
been largely wasted.
In =nominating Adlai E. Stevenson for the Presidency, the
Democratic party has- chosen the leader best qualified to break
Four
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through the sound-barrier of bipartisan silence. Moreover, former
President Truman's savage but futile attempt to block Governor
Stevenson's nomination should at last have removed the incubus
which has blocked Democratic thinking. Whatever may have
been the merits or defects of Truman's foreign policy, the Democratic candidate is no longer under any obligation to defend it.
There can be no doubt that Adlai Stevenson will tell the
American people the unvarnished truth as he sees it. But the
truth, without a clearly defined alternative to the present disastrous
policy, will not suflice.
The Democratic foreign policy plank, adopted at Chicago,
provided no such alternative. It was a hodge-podge of pronouncements and promises designed to appeal to various groups of voters,
rather than a statement of foreign policy. (The Republican plank,
adopted at San Francisco, denied the need for any alternative; in
the words of the staunchly Republican but disappointed New
York Herald Tribune, it "concentrated on past successes and on
a complacent analysis of present trends.") The Democratic platform committed its candidates, if elected, to continued support of
Nationalist China, opposition t'o admitting the Peking regime to
the United Nations and the sending of arms to Israel-three courses
of action which might well be inappropriate by the time a new
administration would take office. Governor Stevenson accepted
the platform without reservation.
In his acceptance speech, Governor Stevenson spoke eloquently of the need for restoring American prestige and leadership but gave no indication of the measures by which this end was
to be attained. If he had in mind any alternative to the policy
which he criticized, it was already late in the day to bring it
forward. The final stages of a Presidential campaign do not
readily lend themselves to the kind of calm, careful elucidation
required to bring about a basic re-orientation of public opinion.
This pamphlet is not intended as a campaign document. It
is written by a Democrat in the rueful belief that the campaign will
be fought chiefly over issues almost wholly irrelevant to the basic
problems confronting this nation and that, whatever the outcome
of the November elections, these problems will remain to be solved.
What we need is not merely a new approach to foreign policy.
Our failures in the foreign field have deep roots here at home. If
our foreign policy conveys the impression that what Americans
desire most is to have a world in revolution stand still, it is chiefly
because we are more concerned here at home with preserving
what we have-or think we have-than with progress.
The world is not going to stand still. Nor can we survive in
it as a status quo power. Adlai Stevenson understands this and

recognizes that, as he put it, we must "get off dead center." But,
while it is true that we cannot regain a position of dynamic influence
abroad until we resume forward progress at home, the reverse is
also true. We cannot resume forward progress at home so long
as we remain tied to a half-frightened and half-belligerent status
quo policy abroad.
The greatest obstacle to be overcome by any leader who
attempts at this late hour to show the American people the way
out of their grave predicament is the state of mind which has
been induced by smug self-righteousnessand Pollyanna propaganda.
We are literally sleep-walking into preventable disaster.
We are living in a dream world in which we alternate between
fond fantasies and nightmares of horror. On the one hand, we
confidently assure ourselves and each other that there will be no
war; that, if there is a war, The Bomb will never be used; and
that, somehow, life will be safer, easier and more pleasant
tomorrow than it is today. On the other hand, we shake with fear
at the approaching end of the world; and in this mood, we either
sink into hopeless and helpless apathy or decide to "eat, drink
and be merry, for tomorrow we die."
The future is neither as rosy nor as hopeless as we see it in
our alternating fantasies. The future is hard and grim but also
full of promise. It is desperate only if we continue to misread
the present and thus miss the opportunities which lie before us.
If you are deeply concerned, as I am, for the future of your
children and grandchildren, for the future of your country and
the future of the human race, you may £ind in these pages not comfort but hope, and perhaps something in the way of guidance
toward its realization.

September, 1956.
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CHAPTER ONE.
T H E ECONOMIC DILEMMA OF THE UNITED STATES.
About two months before the collision of the Stockholm and
the Andrea Doria off Nantucket, I saw a film which reproduced
the tragic night of April 15, 1912, when the White Star liner
Titanic, then on her maiden voyage to New York, struck an iceberg
while going at full speed, ripped out her port side and went to the
bottom of the Atlantic, carrying down with her 1,513 of her 2,224
passengers and crew.
The captain had received repeated warnings of ice ahead but
had failed to reduce speed. After all, his ship, like the ill-fated
Andrea Doria 44 years later, was considered unsinkable because
of its then novel system of bulkheads and watertight compartments.
As the great vessel sailed to her doom, many of the passengers had
retired for the night. Others were still celebrating the successful
voyage, drinking champagne and dancing to the strains of the ship's
orchestra. Among the passengers was the Titanic's designer who
had been so certain of the ship's unsinkability that he had provided
only about half the lifeboats needed for a full complement.
Watching this film I was obsessed by a terrible thought. It
was that we, the people of the United States, are similarly sailing
through the night toward disaster. . . .
Unlike the captain of the Titanic, our leaders have not disregarded the warning of ice ahead but they have fallen into an
equally dangerous error. They have seen only that tenth of the
iceberg which floats above water and which appears as a threat
of communist military aggression. They have prepared against
this threat but have ignored the submerged nine-tenths of the
menace which lies in our path.
Ever since the atomic stalemate has produced the realization
that "there is no alternative to peace", our leaders have begun to
realize that a dictatorship which believes in the inevitability of its
eventual triumph is not very likely to risk the unpredictable hazards
of a major conflict. One by one, most of the Western statesmen
have been forced to question whether the basic challenge to our
civilization is not perhaps more political and economic than
military.

I. THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DANGERS
OUR ECONOMYIS NOT AN UNSINKABLEVESSEL
Unfortunately, when it comes to facing an economic challenge,
American leaders, like the officers of the Titanic, believe themSeven

selves to be in command of an unsinkable vessel. American
supremacy .in economic development and technological advance is
taken as much for granted in Washington as eventual communist
world domination is taken for granted in Moscow.
This complacent assumption of unchallengable American economic supremacy constitutes one of our great dangers. I venture
to make this statement for two reasons:
First, because I believe that the American economy is by no
means as strong or as healthy as our leaders appear to think; and
Second, because available statistics indicate that, at the pres-

ent rates of growth, the Soviet Union may, within the next fifteen
or twenty years, supplant the United States as the chief supplier
of the world's requirements of producer's goods.
These two assertions, if valid, foreshadow the worst disaster
in our history, unless we make rapid radical changes in both our
domestic and our foreign policy.
It is an ungrateful task to predict catastrophe, especially in a
time of widespread complacency like the present. I well remember
some of the angry letters which my father, Paul M. Warburg,
received when he warned, in March 1929, that our then booming
economy was headed for a crash.* I am certain that, were my
father alive today, he would once more consider it a public duty
to sound the alarm, all the more so as in the present crisis the
means are at hand by which disaster can be averted. This was not
true in 1929.
In 1929, we faced the collapse of a speculative boom involving, in the first instance, the securities markets and the banking
system. Ultimately, the collapse carried with it not only the whole
of our national economy but the economies of many other nations,
paralyzing world trade and creating many of the preconditions for
World War 11. The then existing means for arresting the boom
and for controlling excessive speculation were inadequate, even if
there had been any inclination on the part of the Hoover administration to use them. The willingness to act, to undertake measures

,

* 'The late Paul M. Warburg, head of the Bank of the Manhattan Company, was the only important banker who publicly warned against the
impending collapse . ." Elliott V. Bell in We Saw It Happen, Simon &
Schuster, Inc., 1939, page 142.
"Paul Warburg, a great financial authority and a great man who had given
years of his life to the original building up of the Federal Reserve System,
issued early in 1929 public warning that speculation had gone wild and that
the country would have to pay for it . .
Franklin D. Roosevelt in
Looking Forward, John Day Co.,Inc., 1933, page 219.

.
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of reform and to forge new instruments of public power had first
to be created by the ordeal of the Great Depression.
Today, the means exist by which an even greater catastrophe
than that of 1929 can be prevented, but as yet there is no sign
that the imminent danger is recognized or that measures are in
contemplation to meet it.
Since 1929, the focus of our economic infection has shifted
from Wall Street to Madison Avenue and to both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue in our nation's capital. The two great unrecognized
sore spots in our domestic economy are: (1) the reckless overstimulation of consumer demand coupled with the even more
reckless overexpansion of consumer credit; and (2) the depend- ence of our "prosperity" upon the continuation of vast military
expenditures. The first evil is the product of manufacturers, distributors and lending institutions which have become dependent
upon the great advertising agencies. The second evil is the
product of a bipartisan political leadership obsessed with obsolete
concepts of strategy and power politics.

In 1929, when the whole country was seized by a get-richquick speculative mania, American consumers borrowed about
$27.5 billions, or about one-third of their income after taxes.
(Consumer income in 1929 was $83 billions.) Of this consumer
borrowing, about $21 billions consisted of mortgages on 1-4
famiIy non-farrn homes.*
In 1955, American consumers borrowed $124.6 billions
against a disposable income of over $270 billions-a percentage of
46% as against 33% in 1929. Of this borrowing, $88.4 billions
was on home mortgages; $36.2 billions represented various forms
of consumer debt. * * In 1955, it could no longer be assumed that
home mortgages necessarily financed constructive expenditure in
buying, building or modernizing family homes. According to
Fortune Magazine, the proceeds of $5.5 billions of new mortgages
placed upon American homes in 1955 were spent on automobiles,
television sets, vacation travel and other luxury or semi-luxury
items.

* Historical Statistics of the United States, page 174. .** January 1956 Economic Report of the President;

Reserve Bulletin.

July 1956 Federal
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Why were American consumers borrowing so heavily in 1955?
They were not to any appreciable extent speculating in the stock
market. Why did they find it necessary to borrow and spend
146% of their earnings?
Some of the debt was incurred for constructive purposes, such
as home-building and education, or to finance income-producing
improvements or investments. There can be no doubt, however,
that a large part of this huge consumer debt was incurred by
people who bought gadgets and luxury items which they could not
afford, mainly because of sales pressure, social pressure to arrive
at or maintain a certain status, and easy terms of credit. It was
the old story of "champagne taste and beer pocketbook", except
that the champagne taste was now deliberately created by massive
appeal to acquisitiveness, irresponsibility and social snobbery.
It should be emphasized that the evil under discussion is
primarily a middle class evil. The lower income groups borrow
for the most part in order to acquire necessities, but they, too, are
under constant pressure to live beyond their incomes. Moreover,
in the fluid American society, the middle class sets the pattern.
Granted that even frivolous consumption is less injurious to
the nation's economy than hare-brained speculation, the fact
remains that there is a danger to economic stability whenever
a large part of the population over-reaches itself in expenditure,
no matter for what purpose. There is also a danger to the morale
of a people habituated to relying upon luck or government subsidy
to take care of the proverbial rainy day.
It is often overlooked that when the consumer mortgages his
future buying power, the producer mortgages his future sales.
In such circumstances any "corrective recession" is likely to turn
into a major downward spiral, especially when, as is now the
case, one whole sector of the national economy is already suffering
from a prolonged depression.
Now, as in the 1920's, we have the warning of continuing
distress and reduced purchasing power in the farm belt. The
problem posed by falling farm prices and mounting agricultural
surpluses was by no means solved by the legislation passed in
1956 by the 84th Congress, even though the incidence of a drought
in some of the farm states made the soil bank payments authorized
by this legislation effective as a temporary prop to drought-stricken
farmers. The question is not one of fixed or flexible price supports; it is one of devising a radically altered approach to the
farmer's dilemma-an approach based upon adjusting crop proTen

duction to world dematld and of increasing consumption rather
than supporting prices beyond the reach of potential consumers.*

Distress in the farm belt has already affected factory employment. Some labor leaders have taken alarm, but labor's action,
on the whole, has been confined to securing additional wage
increases while the getting is still good, thus raising costs and
prices still further. Businessmen are paying but scant attention
to the danger signals, proceeding to enlarge their plants in the
belief that we face, at worst, a minor set-back, after which the
demands of a rising population will be greater than ever. This is
not because American businessmen are stupid or reckless. It is
because they are assuming the permanence of a safeguard against
a major depression-the continuance of something like 35 billion
dollars a year of government expenditurewhich may not be as
permanent as they think. At a time when the future of every
business is threatened by an ever more dangerous arms race,
American businessmen are taking its continuance for granted.
Let me summarize the domestic economic picture as I see it.
1. Our prosperity is not a "peace prosperity". It is a
precarious preparedness prosperity which will end abruptly if and
when the world comes to its senses and military expenditures are
sharply curtailed, unless government expenditures for other than
military purposes promptly take up the slack. Because we are not
preparing now for any such program of peace-time expenditure,
we are building up a dangerous vested interest in not making peace.
2. Our present high level of production and consumption is
based upon an unhealthy mortgaging of the future. In the absence
of preventive action taken very soon, this condition may before
long result in a downturn which is likely to go much further than
our political and economic leaders seem to anticipate. Such a
setback may well be sharp enough to cause serious unemployment, to re-stimulate racial discrimination, to unbalance the
precariously balanced economies of some of our allies and, worst
of all, to create additional pressures against ending the arms race.

* The need for a new consumer-oriented approach to the American farm
problem was discussed in Turning Point Toward Peace, Chapter 4.

These two factors of internal economic weakness combine
not only to threaten our own prosperity but to jeopardize American
leadership toward world peace.
The danger we face from these domestic sources is magnified
by an external menace: Russia is beginning to beat us at our own
best game.
At the present rates of respective growth, it is estimated by
careN analysts* that Soviet production will, in about five years,
reach the American level of 1956 and that, in ten or fifteen years
more, Russia will have surpassed the United States as the world's
top industrial producer.
That is not all. While a large part of our annual increase
goes into satisfying the over-stimulated and over-financed demands
of the American consumer, most of Russia's annual growth goesat the expense of the Russian consumer for so long as he may
stand for it-into increased production of such things as steel,
machinery, tools and power-plant equipment, including atomic
reactors-in
other words, into precisely the sort of goods for
which the economically retarded countries of the world are
clamoring.
Taken together, the more rapid growth of Soviet production
and its concentration upon producer's goods rather than upon
articles of consumption will rapidly make Russia the chief source
of supply for world economic development.
The political consequences of Soviet economic supremacy are
self-evident. Given a continuation of openly hostile, cut-throat
competition, they amount to communist victory without war. If
we simply project existing trends into the future, Russia will, at
some time during the next generation, control enough of the raw
material sources and markets to make a shambles of Western
prosperity.

This truly terrifying development is by no means inevitable.
If we wake up in time, we have the power to prevent it. Unfortunately, prevention requires a degree of foresight and courage on
the part of American leadership which is not as yet in evidence.
It also requires a considerable willingness to sacrifice on the part
of the American people-a willingness which would, I am con-

* A. Nove in the Lloyds Bank Review, April 1956. T. Balogh in The
Nation, June 9, 1956. Hugh Massingham and Tom Whitney in The New'
Republic, June 11, 1956.
Twelve
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DANGERAND OPPORTUNITY
vinced, exist if the people were told the truth about the existing
dangers and if they were given bold, constructive leadership.

Having played the part of Cassandra, let me now briefly
indicate how this somber projection of present trends may be
proved false-how we can strengthen our economy where it is
weak, increase its rate of growth and re-channel a substantial
part of our productive capacity into the service of world economic
development.

1. Irrespective of whether or not the arms race continues,
we must reduce the dependence of our economy upon military
expenditures. We must also stimulate its growth in order to
prevent Russian hegemony. Both can be accomplished by a
carefully planned program of public and private expenditure
in developing our own "underdeveloped areas9'-by building muchneeded schools, by clearing over-populated slums and building
new housing, by improving transportation facilities, by flood
control and river developments, and perhaps even by stimulating
the growth of new, decentralized industrial centers. The statutory
basis for such an effort already exists in the Employment Act of
1946, which requires the President to take the initiative each year
in presenting to Congress the levels of production and employment needed for the nation's welfare along with recommendations
for public and private action to achieve these gods.
At present, we are inhibited by the misconception that any
program of increased public expenditure would mean deficit finance
and higher taxes. We are not only mesmerized by the fetish of a
balanced budget but misled as to our capabilities within the
limits of achieving a balanced budget. Because we are spending
35 billions a year on unproductive armaments, we are led to
believe that we cannot afford to make even the most necessary
productive expenditures without either irresponsibly increasing the
national debt or imposing additional taxes. Actually, wisely
planned public expenditures combined with proper incentives to
private investment would result only in a larger budget, not an
unbalanced one; the increased rate of growth in our economy would
produce greater revenues and eventually lower taxes. The accent
here is upon "wisely planned public expenditures combined with
proper incentives to private investment". Public spending alone
will not do the job. It depends upon how and for what public
money is spent.
Thirteen

2. In the face of the Soviet challenge, it is not enough to
increase our rate of growth in order to keep ahead of the Soviet
Union. It is also necessary to re-channel some of our increased
production so that the United States, rather than the Soviet
Union, will continue to be the chief source of aid to world
economic development. Our great, long-range advantage over
Russia is that we possess the skius and the resources to meet the
economic requirements of a world in revolution without taking
foreign aid out of the hide of the domestic consumer. We are
capable of being the world's supplier without repressing the living
standard of our own people. We can, however, do this only if
we apply a certain amount of common sense and moral sense to
our definition of a desirable living standard and if we place certain restraints upon our "free enterprise capitalism". These two
provisos are not easy to fulfill.
Part of what we must do in this respect can be accomplished
through government action but most of it depends upon us as
individual citizens.
I suspect that most Americans already know in their hearts
that in recent years their pursuit of happiness has become far too
much a pursuit of material possessions, many of which are not
only unnecessary but actually of little or only ephemeral value.
Most of us realize, I think, that we are talked into buying a lot
of things that we don't really need or want-things that we know
we cannot affordbut purchase nevertheless because they are offered
to us on "easy terms of credit". Most of us are aware of the
fact that we are often persuaded to turn in a car or an appliance
which is still perfectly serviceable merely in order to acquire "the
latest model", because a flood of advertising and clever sales
talk have made us feel that it is somehow not quite respectable
not to keep up with the procession.
What most of us do not realize is that the price of the shiny
new possessions we acquire is often considerably higher than it
need be because of wasteful competition and inflated cost of advertising and distribution. For example:

r
:'
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Out of every dollar the American housewife spends for food,
56 cents go to middlemen and processors. Only 44 cents go to the
farmer who actually produces the food we eat. A part of the
processor's share of the food dollar is a legitimate charge for
doing much of the work formerly done in the family kitchen. A
part of the middleman's share of the food dollar is legitimately
earned by the convenient facilities he provides for retail distribuFourteen

tion. But a considerable part of the 56 cents we pay middlemen
merely defrays the cost of unnecessary and wasteful competition
between concerns selling almost identical products under different
trade names, each spending millions of dollars in advertising the
alleged superiority of its product.
Much of the same thing is true of almost everything we buy,
from automobiles to toothpaste. Can you tell one beer from another
if you don't see the bottle or the can? Can your wife tell the
difference between one lipstick and another if she doesn't see the
packaging? Can either of you identlfy your favorite cigarette
in the dark?
"But," you will say, "this kind of advertising is what supports
television. If it weren't for the beer and cigarette manufacturers, I
couldn't watch baseball games. If it weren't for the cosmetics
people, there would be no such shows as 'The $64,000 Question.' If
it weren't for Mercury, there would be no Ed Sullivan on Sunday."
Very true. And this brings us to one of the aspects of our
social structure that seems to me worth thinking about.
The theory of mass production is that it brings more goods to
more people at lower prices, while at the same time yielding higher
profits to the producers. The first Henry Ford's Tin Lizzie was
the outstanding practical example. The theory holds good, however, only if a steadily expanding market keeps pace with mass
productive capacity. Prior to the Great Depression, whenever
productive capacity outran effective demand-by which I mean
desire to buy plus ability to pay-people were accustomed to
speak of "cyclical overproduction." Lord Keynes, the great
Enghsh economist, was the first to demonstrate that this phenomenon could be more accurately described as underconsumption,
arising from underemployment and a maldistribution of income.
When, under the impact of the Great Depression, the mass producers realized that they needed a more rapidly and more steadily
expanding market than that provided by a laissez-faire economy,
they became reconciled to a certain amount of government intervention in the interest of maintaining the full employment and
stable purchasing power of a rising population.
But even the New Deal reforms were not enough to enable
mass purchasing power to keep pace with the growth of a more
and more automatic mass production.
For a time, the problem was concealed by the incidence of a
war which created abnormal demands both during and immediately
after the conflict. But, when the backed-up post-war consumer
demand had finally been satisfied, industry was again faced with
Fifteen

the problem of how to create a more rapidly expanding market.
In these circumstances, the mass producers resorted to two
expedients, neither of them new but neither of which had been
used before on a massive scale: the first was to stimulate the
consumer's desire to buy by advertising; the second was to increase
the consumer's abiliiy to buy by offering various forms of consumer credit.
Neither of these two devices can permanently solve the
problem of an increasingly mechanized economy. Either device,
if abused, can do considerable harm.
The expansion of consumer credit creates no new purchasing
power; it merely makes future purchasing power available in the
present. If credit is used wisely and for productive purposes,
its availability can be beneficial, as, for instance, when a young
man buys a house on mortgage credit instead of rearing his family
in a crowded apartment or tenement. If, on the other hand,
credit is used unwisely to acquire unnecessary luxuries or to
pretend- to an economic status beyond the borrower's earning
power, it can do great harm. No matter how consumer credit is
used, the fact remains that its excessive expansion removes one
of the chief safeguards against letting a normal recession turn
into a deflationary spiral.
Whether advertising is beneficial or harmful depends upon
what sort of appetites it stimulates. In the American society, however, advertising has assumed a disproportionate influence not
only upon the consumer but upon the producer and upon almost
every facet of American business and American life.
Let us grant that there could be no mass market for consumer goods without national advertising and that there could be
no national advertising without the mass media of communication.
This might be expected to leave the mass media of communication in the driver's seat; but such is not the case in the American
society. The mass media of communication in our society live on
advertising revenue, because we, the American people, prefer not
to pay for more than a fraction of the cost of our information
and entertainment. Since we want our daily newspaper for 5 cents
or less, Life Magazine for 20 cents and television for nothing,
the price we pay is that of having our information and entertainment suffocated in sales talk and, so far as entertainment i s
concerned, dictated by the panjandrums of Madison Avenue.
The result is that individual taste in the United States is being
submerged by a mass "taste". artificially created by the specialists
in sales promotion. Madison Avenue now determines how'

DANGERAND OPPORTUNITY
Americans shall live, eat, clothe and amuse themselves. The
people who dream up slogans and displays, who write radio soapopera and television shows, who "package" entertainment and
streamline even the words addressed to us by the President, have
not only become the arbiters of American business but of the
present American "way of life".
I am not suggesting that we attempt to make any drastic
changes in this rather'strange order, but I am suggesting that we
apply a little more common sense; that we, as individuals, develop
a little more sales resistance; and that we support certain government action to curb some of the abuses of our free enterprise
system.
There are a variety of actions our government could take to
bring more necessities within reach of the consumer's income and
to limit or discourage the excessive production of nonessential
luxuries. Government could, for example, investigate and, if
warranted, prosecute under the anti-trust laws some of the giant
corporations open to suspicion of monopolistic practices. This
might result in a considerable reduction of food and other prices.
The tax laws could be revised in such a manner as to eliminate
the tax deductibility of questionable business expenditures, such as
elaborate entertainment, "institutional advertising" and other items
presently encouraged by the fact that "Uncle Sam pays for it anyway". A mild version of wartime allocation of basic materials
could be devised so as to discourage the production of luxury
items, particularly where substantially the same product is marketed and heavily advertised under competing trade names.
Another field for desirable action by our public and private
agencies is that of providing better insurance against the vicissitudes which, through no fault of their own befall the very young,
the very old and those who are stricken by disease or accident.
Inevitable shifts in employment due to new automatic processes,
new materials and increasing foreign competition (as, for example,
in textiles) demand more effective cushions than we now provide
against displacement and readjustment. The United States lags
far behind other developed countries in providing adequate health
insurance. It lags dangerously far behind the Soviet Union in
providing full educational facilities.
There is no contradiction, as I see it, between urging greater
thrift and less frivolous consumption on the one hand, and
increased social services on the other. The people need greater
protection than they now enjoy against developments over which
they have no control. They need to exercise more restraint and
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more common sense in bdancing those factors of income and
expenditure which they do control.
In the presently prevaiting mood of complacency, government
action such as that here suggested is not likely to be popular. Yet
such action will not be undertaken and, if undertaken, will not be
effective, unless it enjoys wide public support. I am convinced
that public support would be forthcoming, if the American people
were given a chance to understand the truth about their present
perilous position.
Must it take a war or a depression to bring out the best that is
in us? Are we incapable of acting wisely in our own interest to
anticipate and prevent a catastrophe before it is too late?

Fortunately, what we must do in the interest of our own
domestic health and stability will almost automatically set us on
the right path toward rendering effective assistance abroad. Once
we free our national policy from outworn bookkeeping concepts
of penny-wisdom and pound foolishness, resume our forward
progress and develop our great potential, we shall be able to
approach the problem of world economic development in a wholly
different light. We shall then find that, without inflicting any
hardship upon ourselves, we can serve world progress far better
than the Russians or any other nation.
We shall then address ourselves to making the tools, the
maCbes, the power-plant equipment and the atomic reactors that
other people need and want. We shall grow the crops needed to
raise the nutrition level of the undernourished peoples, instead of
merely trying to supply them with the surplus of what we make or
grow for ourselves.
The next problem will then be to develop methods of enabling
other countries to acquire what we are able to produce for them.
Part of our publicly and privately planned domestic development
must be to create markets in this country for the surplus products
of other countries, particularly the underdeveloped nations. Why
should not we, instead of the Russians, be able to take Ceylonese
rubber in exchange for tools and machinery? Why should we go
on producing a surplus cotton crop which overhangs the world
market, leaving it to the Soviet bloc to barter manufactured goods
for Egypt's cotton?
Trade cannot, of course, supplant aid entirely. Many of the
crucially important countries, like India, wiU require long-term
loans and investments of foreign capital. The revamping of our

economy must provide not only for liberalizing our own import
restrictions but for a deliberate program of long-term investment
abroad. The more of this investment can be channeled through
the 'United Nations, the better. The more we challenge Russia to
direct its foreign aid through the United Nations to match our
contribution, the more we shall reduce Russian ability to gain
political influence through bilateral economic assistance.
In my last book, referred to in the introduction,* I presented
a detailed study of our foreign trade and foreign lending and
investment policies. The revision of these policies which seemed
urgent in 1955 has become even more urgent today.
I did not say then and I do not say now that we must revise
our policies merely in order to meet the communist economic
offensive. What I do say is that while the communists have
created no new imperatives, they have shortened the time in which
we must do what our own enlightened self-interest has long
demanded. Had there been no communist dictatorships, it is possible that the revolt of the underprivileged two-thirds of humanity
might have been postponed for another generation. What the
communists have done is to force us to face here and now the
fact that the time is past when the white peoples of the Atlantic
Community can hope to live in freedom, comfort and security
while the rest of the world exists in various degrees of misery.
The communists have moved up the deadline for a decision which
had already become inescapable.
Before that deadline is reached, we shall have to win the
confidence and friendship of the peoples who are emerging into
freedom and seeking a fair share of the world's productivity, or
else our civilization will perish. Before the time left to us expires,
we shall have to move into the vanguard of the existing world
revolution or else be overrun by it.
This is by no means solely an economic problem. Its most
important aspects may well be the liquidation of colonialism and
of the notion of "white supremacy" but the economic aspect is
what we are discussing here. I shall limit myself to repeating a
few of the concrete suggestions previously put forward:

1 . Let us rid ourselves of the notion that we cannot afford
to contribute generously to world economic development until
savings can be realized from a reduction of armaments. Let us
recognize instead that we cannot afjord NOT to make that contribution now, irrespective of what we spend on armaments.

* Op. cit. Turning Point

Toward Peace. Chapters 5 and 6.

This is a point which this writer has repeatedly emphasized,
ever since 1950, when the late Senator Brien MacMahon of
Connecticut introduced a resolution pledging American savings
from arms reduction to world economic development. A similar
pledge was given by President Eisenhower in 1953. As previously
pointed out, "This is a noble promise, but starving people cannot
eat promises".
We are not taking here about any fantastic figures. The
highest estimate of what it would take to raise incomes in the
underdeveloped areas by 2% each year is about 10 billion dollars.
Other more conservative analyses indicate that 2% to 3 billion
dollars per annum is the maximum of foreign capital that could
profitably be put to work in the underdeveloped areas.* Even
if the United States were to assume all of this annual burden,
which it would certainly not do, its contribution would be considerably less than the American people spend annually on cosmetics.

2. Let us rid ourselves of the notion that the capital needs of
m
e underdeveloped areas can be supplied by self-liquidating bank
loans and private equity investment.**
Neither bank loans nor private investment can supply the
funds needed for malaria and pest control, for harbor and transportation development, or for the building of schools and hospitals.
World Bank and Export-Import Bank loans can be made only
within the limits of strict charter requirements, though the new
International Finance Corporation will be able, so far as its limited

* Chairman J. D. Zellerbach of the non-partisan Committee for Economic
Development recently summarized a careful staff study as follows:
"Conservative estimates suggest that the independent underdeveloped eountries should be able to use effectively between $1 billion and $1.5 billion of
new foreign capital each year during the next few years, over and above the
$1.1 they are now receiving". It should be noted that this figure does not
include colonial possessions. The committee's figure of $1.1 new capital
presently flowing into the independent underdeveloped areas comprises $400
million in U. S. economic assistance, $170 million in World Bank and
Export-Import Bank loans, $50 million in European loans and $500 million
in private investment. The latter figure is, of come, mostly oil company
investment.
** This, too, is a fallacy which the writer has been at pains to expose ever
since the controversy, in 1949, between the supporters of President Truman's
original "Point Four" Program and the proponents of a substitute measure
introduced by Christian A. Herter, then a Republican Congressman from
Massachusetts. (Point Four--Our Chance to Achieve Freedom from Fear,
Current Affairs Press, 1949; also Faith, Purpose and Power, Farrar Straw 8
Young, 1950; How to Coexist Without Playing the Kremlin's Garne, Beacon
Press, 1952; and Turning Point Toward Peace, chapters 5 and 6 already
cited.)

resources of $100 miUion pennit, to broaden the field at least a
little.
As for private investment in the underdeveloped areas, the
ten year total of such American investment, apart from the exploitation of mineral resources, has amounted to only about $100 million.
As against this paltry sum, private investment in the United States
has averaged over $45 billion each year. The reason is obvious.
Private capital seeks maximum profit at minimum risk. Before
private investors will venture into the underdeveloped areas to any
substantial extent, seed-money supplied out of public funds must
create the political and economic conditions which will attract
private venture capital. Even then, private capital will not always
be welcome, because it has so long been associated with colonial
rule and foreign exploitation.

3. The third major change in our foreign econamic policy
advocated by this writer ever since economic assistance programs
were initiated is to shift the emphasis from the bilateral to the
multilateral approach. This idea has recently gained a number of
important adherents. Among political leaders, Governor Adlai
Stevenson, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and New York's
Governor Averell Harriman have advocated such a course. The
intluential newspaper publisher, John Cowles, of Minneapolis, has
vigorously urged channeling aid through the United Nations. At
least two writers who formerly supported bilateral aid programsBarbara Ward and Willard Espy-have recently espoused a multilateral approach. On the other hand, President Eisenhower has,
so far, rejected the idea and Congressional sentiment its a whole
is probably not yet ready for it.
It has always seemed to this observet extremely unwise for the
United States to let itself appear either as the world's harsh banker
or the world's benevolent rich uncle. Instead of making ourselves
the sole judges as to the legitimate needs of other peoples and then
providing such aid as we might see fit in each individual case, it
would seem a wiser and a more effective course to channel our
contribution through the United Nations, preferably through a new
United Nations Development Authority created for this purpose.
In the past, four major arguments have appeared to me to support
this contention:
a) A United Nations Development Authority would be better
equipped than are Washington bureaucrats and Congressional
committees to evaluate relative needs for capital assistance and to
decide what conditions, if any, should be attached to such aid.
Twenty-one
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b) Conditions imposed by a United Nations Authority would
be more readily accepted by the beneficiary governments than the
same conditions if imposed by the United States. This is especially
- important with respect to fostering land reform and the creation - -.
of agricultural credit facilities in countries oppressed by large landholders and usurious money-lenders.
c) A United Nations Development Authority could more
readily make long-range plans and enter into long-range commitments than can the American government. Successful economic
,.
development requires long-range planning and the assurance that
capital for approved plans will be forthcoming.
d) It would be far easier for our Congress to appropriate
annual global contributions to a United Nations Development
. Authority than to make up its mind each year how many, if any,
dollars to allot to each individual applicant for assistance. (The
contention that Congress cannot legally appropriate funds for more
than one year at a time may be technically correct but it has
certainly been violated in the case of such domestic programs as
river development or naval construction, which by their nature
extend over a period of years.)
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To these four arguments there is now added a fifth:
e) The more we channel our aid to economic development ;
through the United Nations, the more we challenge the Soviet
Union to meet our contributions. To the extent that Soviet aid
can be made to flow through the United Nations, it will be stripped
of political overtones. Thus this particular modification of American policy could be an important factor in converting SovietAmerican competition into cooperation.
j

4. Finally, the use of surplus food as capital-an idea as yet
insufficiently explored--could help us to kill two birds with one
stone: it would dispose of presently useless surpluses costly to US
and dangerous to other agricultural producers, while at the same
time reducing the amount of money we should have to appropriate ;
to meet our commitments to a United Nations Development Authority.*
These four major changes in our approach to aiding world
economic development would, I believe, provide the necessary
i
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* Professor Matthew Kust of Harvard University, has made a revealing
study of how this idea could be applied to India. A broader application has
recently been suggested by Haldore Hanson of the Public Affairs Institute,
Washington, D. C. See also op. cit. Turning Point Toward Peace, pages
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point of departure for the formation of the urgently needed policy
revision.
The Eisenhower administration's Foreign Aid Bill of 1956
and the debate over this measure in the Congress gave the impression that the American government was almost wholly unaware
of the need for a new approach. Yet there is considerable evidence that, behind the scenes, serious thought is being given to the
matter. The writings of Chester Bowles, our former ambassador
to India, and a scholarly study by Professors Max F. Millikan and
W. W. Rostow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have
had careful attention. The report made to the House Foreign
Affairs Committee by Representatives Brooks Hays, Democrat of
Arkansas, and Chester E. Merrow, Republican of New Hampshire
-both members of the 1956 United States Delegation to the
United Nations-shows
that there is increasing Congressional
understanding. Other studies, such as that undertaken under the
auspices of the Public Affairs Institute of Washington, D. C., evidence the growing interest of labor organizations and cooperatives.
My own study was widely distributed by religious, educational and
other civic organizations.
Progress is regrettably slow but, nevertheless, some of the
fixed ideas and inflexible positions are beginning to thaw out. It
is beginning to be recognized that it is foolish to attach political
and especially military strings to economic aid and that it is idle
to rail at "socialism" or to seek to promote "free enterprise capitalism" in countries where there is no private capital and where
government action in the economic field is essential to progress.
Under the leadership of President Eisenhower, at least one wing
of the Republican party has been converted to support of more
liberal foreign trade policies. On the other hand, the growing
industrialization of the South has brought considerable reinforcements to the Republican right wing from ultra-copservative
.
Southern Democrats.
The chief stumbling block to the urgently needed new
approach to foreign economic policy remains the reluctance to
appropriate the necessary public funds. This derives less from
a failure to understand the need than from obsolete, pinch-penny
conceptions of internal economic policy.
If domestic "budgetitis" is the first obstacle to be overcome,
"pactitis"-the
obsessive preoccupation with forming and sustaining worldwide military alliances-runs a close second. This brings
us to a consideration of -the politico-military dilemma in which we
find ourselves at the present time.
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WANTED: A NEW APPROACH TO
A CHANGING WORLD.
I. BEWILDERMENT ON CAPITOL HILL
It became apparent, during the early months of 1956 that, in
spite of the rapidly changing international scene, the Eisenhower
administration had no intention of undertaking any basic reexamination, much less a revision of its foreign policy, at least until
after the November elections. Democratic aspirants to the Presidency and some of the Democrats in the Congress were vocal in
their criticism of the smug self-satisfaction of the Republican
Secretary of State, of his sometimes tactless or boastful pronouncements and of what they called "Republican bluff, blunder and
bluster." But, whereas there was considerable criticism of execution, there was scarcely any indication that the Democrats desired,
any more than the Republicans, to question the basic premises of
a policy the bankruptcy of which was daily becoming more
apparent.
This curious and, to me, alarming bipartisan silence as to the
fundamental questions of foreign policy inspired the following
letter, addressed to the Democratic Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:
April 9, 1956
The Honorable Walter F. George
Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator George:
Since our correspondence last autumn* matters have
gone from bad to worse. Not only has the predicted
Soviet diplomatic and economic offensive materialized
but affairs in the Middle East have taken an even more
serious turn than anticipated. This letter is prompted by
a deep concern over the fact that the mounting crisis
does not as yet seem to have stirred either Congress or
the administration to effective action.
It is now perfectly clear that the two immediate aims
of Soviet policy are:
1. To win the friendship or at least the benevolent
neutrality of the uncommitted peoples of Asia and the

* Concerning the writer's proposals published in 1955.

Middle East, thereby outflanking the Atlantic Community and eventually encircling it.
2. TOweaken the Atlantic Alliance at its vital center
by encouraging neutralism, fostering cleavages among
the participants and, if possible, isolating the United
States.
In recent months, Soviet leadership has made dangerous progress in both directions.
Is it not apparent that the present bipartisan foreign
policy of the United States is inadequate to meet this
challenge and that, in fact, some of its aspects play
directly into the Kremlin's hands?
In the Far East, we are frozen into immobility by
our stubborn refusal to recognize the unpalatable but
immutable fact that there is no way to settle the questions of Korea, Indo-China and Formosa by peaceful
means, except through negotiation with the Chinese
People's Republic. You, yourself, have issued several
statesmanlike appeals for such negotiations. Meanwhile,
in the absence of direct, high-level negotiation, we
remain poised indefinitely at the brink of war. Not only
that, but we increasingly alienate our allies and potential
friends by a policy which seems dangerous and unreasonable to all except Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman
Rhee, both of whom openly desire war.
Last July, you wisely warned against our allowing
our support of our European allies to place us in a false
position with respect to the emerging peoples of Asia,
Africa and the Middle East. The disregard of that warning has had disastrous consequences. The subordination
of political considerations to the attempt to complete an
encircling band of military pacts and alliances has failed
to create military strength and has, on the other hand,
created precisely that political weakness and dissension
which the communists desired to exploit.
The SEAT0 alliance has weakened rather than
strengthened the anticommunist front in Asia by antagonizing India and Burma, creating an atmosphere
throughout Southeast Asia dangerously receptive to
Soviet --propaganda. Our insistence upon Japanese
rearmament, in violation of the constitution which we
against us. A
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mission expressed the opinion that the West is in the
process of losing Southeast Asia. As Southeast Asia
goes, so, inevitably, goes Japan. If Southeast Asia
goes communist, Japan will be unable to live except by
trade with countries under Sino-Soviet domination.
In the Middle East, the abortive attempt to erect a
military barrier against Russia has merely opened the
door to communist political penetration. The Baghdad
Pact has split the Arab world, brought Israel and the
Arab states to the verge of war and made Egypt into
the focal center of an anti-Western revolt which has
spread from Asia Minor into North Africa. Our two
major allies, France and Britain, now face the loss of
possessions which would render the one politically
impotent and the other financially bankrupt.
Perhaps most serious of all is the effect of this
disaster upon the organization of states which form the
heart and soul of the anti-communist coalition. The
southeastern flank of the NATO alliance has disintegrated. Greece is disaffected because of its quarrel
with Britain over Cypms. Greece and Turkey are no
longer on speaking terms. Tito has withdrawn into
neutralism.
Worse yet, on the vital central front of NATO, the
cream of the French contingents have been withdrawn
into North Africa. The 12 West German divisions, for
the sake of which we have wrecked our European policy
and foreclosed the hope of a German peace settlement,
will not exist for three years-if, indeed, they ever come
into existence as a reliable reinforcement of NATO.
German sentiment is rapidly veering away from Chancellor Adenauer's leadership.
The British, the French, the Italians and the
Germans are openly demanding a basic revision of
coalition policy. The bankruptcy of that
apparent in every part of the world.
What more could the Russians desire? What more
is required to make the United States un
serious reexamination of the premises up
has been operating?
The fact is that Stalin's aggressive tactics originally
frightened us into making two assumptions
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I was invited to testify before your Committee. These
assumptions were :
1. That Western Europe constituted the primary
target of Soviet expansionism; and
2. That the aggressive designs of international
communism would be carried out primarily by
military means.
These assumptions led us into twofold error. They
led us to adopt a Europe-oriented policy in Asia and the
Middle East, instead of a policy based upon the conditions existing in those areas. They led us to attempt the
building of a world-wide anti-communist coalition upon
the sole foundation of military defense against political
invasion.
To undermine such a structure, Stalin's heirs needed
only to make a convincing show of renouncing warlike
intentions and to support Asian and Arab nationalism.
The first move was easy because the Russians themselves had never wanted a major war. The second was
made possible by our failure to lay the political, economic and psychological foundations for an effective
anti-communist coalition.
The situation is not yet hopeless, but it is rapidly
deteriorating and may well become hopeless unless the
United States takes remedial action within the next few
months.
Since the administration seems unwilling or unable
to undertake the necessary revision and revitalization of
American policy, could not such action be initiated by
your Committee?
Copies of this letter were sent by the writer to each member
of the Foreign Relations Committee and to a few other leading
members of the Senate, along with a personal note asking for an
expression of opinion. Some of the replies received were perfunctory; others expressed varying degrees of interest. It was a
significant fact that not a single Senator took issue with the analysis
presented and that not a single Senator defended or expressed
satisfaction with the existing foreign policy. Several Senators
went out of their way to welcome the suggestion that a serious
study be undertaken by the Foreign Relations Committee. The
following excerpts serve as examples:

I hope that the Foreign Relations Committee will
give careful study and thought to the issues raised in
your communication which I found both interesting
and very provocative. I agree with you that it is high
time for the United States to undertake a serious
re-examination of the premises upon which it is operating in the foreign field.

I want you to know of the pleasure with which I
read your letter to Senator George. I think it is one of
the most complete, concise and accurate statements of
the present deplorable situation in the conduct of our
foreign affairs that I have seen.
I am sure that you appreciate that I agree with you
on many matters mentioned in your letter. . . I certainly do not think you understate the dangers facing us
abroad.

.

You and I have held views with regard to the Soviet
menace which have closely paralleled each other over a
period of years. Particularly with reference to the
rearming of Germany it now seems clear that we were
right and the administration wrong.

. .

The first three excerpts were from Democrats; the last was
from a Republican.
Senator George himself said in his reply:
As you know, I have been concerned for some time
with the problems raised in your letter and have recently
suggested that the Committee on Foreign Relations
undertake a comprehensive review of our foreign aid
programs. I am enclosing a copy of the preliminary
memorandum which I submitted to the Committee on
this subject.
The memorandum suggested the appointment by the Senate
of a committee of qualified experts authorized to make a study of
foreign aid and to present its recommendations when Congress
reconvened in January, 1957. Concerning this proposal, I ventured to make two comments: first, that the world would not stand

still until 1957 just because the United States was preoccupied
with electing a President and a new Congress; and, second, that
not merely our foreign aid programs but our entire foreign policy
stood in need of reexamination and revision. I expressed doubt
whether even the best new foreign aid program could be effective
in the existing context of inflexible, static policy with respect to the
rapidly changing political problems of Europe, Asia and the Middle
East. Nothing came of the suggestion for a broader inquiry.
Senate Resolution 285, adopted on July 11, 1956, provided only
for a study of the foreign aid programs.
As a matter of fact, nothing in the way of constructive legislation in the field of foreign affairs came out of the entire second
session of the 84th Congress. The President made a half-hearted
effort to obtain approval of United States membership in the
Organization for Trade Cooperation. This matter was shunted
aside by bipartisan agreement. As for foreign aid, the President's
so-called Mutual Security Bill asked for $4.9 billion for the fiscal
year beginning July 1, 1956. Of this amount, $4.1 billion was for
military aid and "defense support". Only $470 million was allotted
to economic development. Senator Mike Mansfield (D) of Montana called the measure "more of the same old medicine in a new
bottle". Other Congressional leaders were critical of the overemphasis upon military aid and the lack of any indication that the
administration was giving constructive thought to meeting the
Soviet economic offensive, but none of these leaders developed any
counter-proposals. After long debate, Congress finally contented
itself with lopping off a little over $1 billion, chiefly from the
military aid appropriations.
In part, Congressional opposition derived from the growing
conviction that the whole program offered by the administration
was obsolete; in part it was based upon reluctance to continue
any kind of foreign aid at all. Yet, in contrast to the expressed
reservations as to the value of military aid to allied countries,
Congress insisted upon adding $900 million to the $35 billion
requested by the President for our own military establishments.
As the legislators hurried home to their constituencies with
their minds on the coming elections, they left behind a peculiar
impression. They had made clear their awareness that some sort
of a new, non-military approach to the sharpening world crisis
was needed, but they had done nothing to develop any such
approach. They had, in the last analysis, been content to follow
the administration's political judgment, which was to leave foreign
policy frozen in its inflexible mold, at least until after the elections.
Twenty-nine

Yet they had questioned and over-ridden the President's judgment
in the very field in which they considered him most competent, by '
giving him more than he thought wise or necessary for the United ' .
States Strategic Air Force and less than he considered a safe
minimum for military aid to allied governments.
Confronted with the picture of crumbling military alliances
abroad, the mood of Congress had been to turn away from such
alliances rather than to search for means of strengthening them.
Confronted with revelations of hitherto unsuspected Soviet progress in approaching air-atomic parity, Congress acted with haste
and determination to spur on a greater American effort.

11. CONFUSION IN THE PENTAGON
This obvious trend toward going it alone-toward a sort of
latter-day isolationism in the military field-was nourished by the
confused and often contradictory statements emanating from the
highest American military officials. If bewilderment reigned on
Capitol Hill, there was even greater confusion in the Pentagon.
One school of thought insisted upon the vital importance of preparedness to meet "brushfire wars" with conventional forces.
Another school placed its emphasis almost solely upon air-atomic
retaliatory power. Insistence upon the value of conventional forces
implied the belief that only "tactical" nuclear weapons would ever
be used in any future war. On the other hand, reliance upon
air-atomic retaliatory power implied that any aggression would be
met by the use of "strategic"-that
is to say, thermonuclear
weapons of massive destructive power.
The great debate between these two schools of thought was
waged for the most part in secret. Yet enough of it leaked out
to cause the anxious layman to ask himself at least two questions:

1. Can there be any "brushfire wars", except perhaps in a
few remote parts of the world where the vital interests of the
great powers are not yet directly involved?
2. Can air-atomic retaliatory power in the hands of a nation,
like the United States, which will obviously be most reluctant to
use it, deter a series of local aggressions? In other words, will a
deterrent deter, if it is of such a nature that the execution of the
retaliatory threat involves not only mass murder but probable
suicide?

My own answer to these two questions is negative.
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There can be no "brushfire wars" which will not sooner or
later hvolve the interests of the powers possessing nuclear
weapons. There are presently only three such powers: the United
States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Unless these weapons
are abolished by reliably enforced disarmament, there will soon be
many more "atomic powers". If any "brushfire war" goes against
the interests of an atomic power, it will use atomic weapons rather
than suffer defeat.
It is nonsense to think that, in such an event, only "tactical"
atomic weapons will be employed. (This is the concept upon
which NATO planning for the defense of Western Europe has been
based.)
In the first place, what are "tactical" targets? Surely, they
include not only troops in the field but roads, railroads, bridges,
airfields and centers of communication.
Secondly-and this is not generally realized-nuclear weapons of less than a megaton (the equivalent of less than 1 million
tons of TNT) do not send their radioactive clouds into the stratosphere and, hence, the radioactive fall-out per ton of force i s
actually greater from small bombs than from superbombs. Moreover, "tactical" bombs have a greater fall-out because they are
exploded closer to the ground and pick up more radioactive
material. Had "tactical" atomic weapons been used in Korea, it
is quite possible that tens of thousands of Japanese might have
been killed. Had they been used on the besiegers of Dienbienphu,
no one knows how many casualties might have resulted in Burma,
Thailand and Malaya.
Now suppose that Country "X" and Country "Y"are at war
and that both possess a full range of atomic and thermonuclear
weapons. If the wind happens to blow in such a direction that
millions of people die in Country " X because of Country "Y's" use
of "tactical" atomic weapons at the front, are we to assume that
Country "X"will not at once retaliate with the most lethal weapons
in its possession?
As for the second question, it seems very doubtful whether
the threat of air-atomic retaliation, employed against a nation
possessing approximately equal air-atomic power, would deter
such a nation from small, local adventures. As matters stand today,
China might be deterred from attempting to seize Matsu or
Quemoy, unless backed by Soviet air-atomic power, but it is hard to
conceive of Russia being deterred by fear of American air-atomic
retaliation from seizing a strip of Finnish territory or a few border
villages in Iran-assuming that she had any desire to do so. The
Thirty-one

Russians surely know that the United States would be most
unlikely to attempt a defense of either Finland or a few Iranian
villages by committing suicide.
Indeed, for the defense of what nation or what territory
would the American people commit suicide? This is the question
we must answer, if we place our sole reliance upon air-atomic
retaliatory power.
Against a would-be aggressor possessing air-atomic power
or assured of its certain support, retaliatory air-atomic power can
be relied upon as a deterrent only to restrain a full-scale nuclear
attack or a local adventure which the would-be aggressor knows
to be a certain provocation to N1-scale nuclear war.
The simple truth is that, until the threat and the blackmail
power of nuclear weapons are abolished, we must maintain airatomic superiority, realizing that it protects us only against fullscale air-atomic attack. But the further truth is that all war
between nations possessing nuclear weapons is now unthinkable;
that any war is now likely to involve such nations; and that ever
more costly defense establishments of whatsoever nature can at
best only preserve an increasingly intolerable balance of terror.

III. DISARMAMENT
The corollary to these conclusions is that the achievement
of reliably enforced universal disarmament should be the overriding objective of every nation's foreign policy.
Such is not the case with respect to American foreign policy
at the present time.
It-is a shocking fact-and yet a fact we ought to face-that
if the communist dictatorships were suddenly to declare their
wilIingness to adhere to a plan of reliably enforced disarmament,
we in this country would find ourselves wholly unready to accept it.
This is partly because we cling to a concept of national
sovereignty irrelevant to the atomic age, and partly because our
leaders-with a few notable exceptions*-have for years played
with the idea of universal disarmament without ever coming to
grips with the basic facts of the problem. They say over and over

* One of these notable exceptions has been former Air Force Secretary,
Thomas K. Finletter. Another has been Senator Ralph E. Flanders (R) of
Vermont, whose speech, delivered June 29, 1956, on the floor of the Senate,
not only pointed out the urgent necessity for disarmament but vigorously
asserted its practicability.
The nearest that official American policy ever came to dealing with the
basic questions involved in disarmament was when the United States put
forward its original proposal for the international control of atomic energy.
This proposal, however, failed to deal with disarmament as a whole.
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again-and rightly so-that the United States will not disarm,
except under a universally adopted plan providing for foolproof
enforcement. So far, so good. But what our leaders appear
either not to know or else knowingly to conceal from the people
is that there can be no foolproof plan of enforcement without the
establishment of a supranational enforcement agency endowed
with the exclusive right to maintain and, if necessary, to use armed
force to prevent or suppress aggression.
There can be no peace among nations, any more than there
can be peace in a community of individuals, without law and a
policeman to enforce it. There can be no law without some form
of government. Anyone who speaks seriously of universal enforced
disarmament, necessarily speaks of the enactment of some degree
of world law and the establishment of an enforcement agency
having some of the attributes of a world government.
These are, I know, fighting words to many patriotic Americans. Even the most limited form of "world government" means
to them "letting foreigners rule ow country". Of course, it means
no such thing. It does mean relinquishing to a supranational
agency of strictly defined and limited powers the right to maintain
or use armed force. It does mean contributing to the support of
that limited world government, but the cost of such a contribution
would be only an infinitesimal fraction of what we now spend
on our national military establishments.
Let me quite bluntly state the facts as I see them:

1. There is no way to limit war or control the size and
nature of armaments. So long as there is the possibility of any
nation resorting to armed aggression, the attempt to limit the
kinds or numbers of weapons to be employed in war will be
utterly futile.
2. Either we abolish war and national armaments altogether,
or we must rely upon what used to be called a balance of power
and is now quite properly called a "balance of terror".
3. We cannot abolish war and national armaments by any
agreement resting upon good faith. We need an armed enforcement agency standing above the disarmed nations.

4. We cannot have such an enforcement agency unless we
are willing, along with all the other nation-states, to participate
in its creation, in its endowment with adequate powers and in its
maintenance.

5. If we are not ready to make the strictly limited sacrifice
of sovereignty which this entails, then we had better stop talking
about universal disarmament.
I am convinced that if the American people had the problem presented to them in these terms and if they were shown a
concrete plan illustrating how such a supranational enforcement
agency would work, they would surprise our timid bipartisan
leadership by giving it their overwhelming approval. But no
American President nor Secretary of State nor candidate for these
high offices has as yet stated the problem of disarmament in these
unvarnished terms.
The reason why the case has not been presented in this simple
fashion is not that the difliculties involved in formulating such
a plan are insuperable. A number of private citizens have put
forward drafts which might well serve as a starting point, the most
useful, in my judgment, being the studies undertaken by the eminent lawyer, Grenville Clark, in association with Professor Louis
B. Sohn of Harvard University.
Nor is the reason for bipartisan silence on this subject the
obvious probability that the Russians would at present reject
any plan of foolproof enforcement. This is merely the excuse
for intellectual laziness and political cowardice.
Consider, if you please, what would be the effect upon the
world's peoples if the United States were to lay before them for
discussion a concrete plan for enforced disarmament which the
American people had approved in principle and stood ready to
adopt. Consider what would be the effect on the world's peoples
if such a plan were rejected by the communist dictators. Is it not
clear that this would be the surest way to demonstrate where in
the present world lie the real obstacles to the establishment of
enduring peace? And would not such a development bring an
almost irresistible pressure to bear upon the communist dictatorships?
Before we can undertake such a demonstration, however, we
must educate ourselves to the point where an American President
could put forward such a proposal knowing that he had the full
support of the Congress and the people. Are we now educating
ourselves in that direction? Are any of our leaders trying to promote discussion and understanding? Have any of us demanded
that candidates for office, from the Presidency down, tell us where
they stand on this issue?
The answer to all three questions is negative. As a result,
the world senses that our words about disarmament are empty

of meaning. The world knows, even if most Americans do not
realize it, that our government has retreated from seeking a foolproof method of disarmament to a mere quest for a system of
inspection which would give adequate advance warning of a surprise attack. President Eisenhower's "open-sky'proposal was an
effective gesture of goodwill, but careful scrutiny shows it to be
nothing more than a proposal to instdl a burglar alarm system
without providing any means of frustrating or apprehending the
burglar.
There can be very little doubt that the vast majority of other
Western nations would gladly go along with the United States,
if the United States were prepared to take a constructive lead.
A few leaders, hopelessly wedded to the now bankrupt policy of
winning the cold war through a show of military strength, might
still object; but it is diflicult to imagine their being able to sustain their objection even in their own countries.
As matters now stand, it appears to the majority of the
world's peoples that, while the Russians want disarmament and
have moved forward a little toward permitting adequate inspection
and enforcement (though by no means far enough), the United
States has actually been moving backward, away from disarmament toward some sort of a system designed merely to make the
balance of terror a little less terrifying.
This impression is reinforced by the Eisenhower administration's refusal to consider a banning of further tests of nuclear
weapons. Such a ban was suggested by Governor Adlai Stevenson
but flatly rejected by President Eisenhower and Atomic Energy
Commission Chairman, Lewis L. Strauss. Yet the banning of
nuclear tests and tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles can
now be adequately enforced by monitoring. Nuclear explosions
can be detected by methods in use for the past six years. It
should be perfectly possible to detect by radar the launching of
intercontinental missiles. As Senator Ralph E. Flanders (R) of
Vermont stated in a recent letter to the New York Times,*
"Anything that can be monitored is ripe for negotiated control."
Unless the United States changes its attitude toward disannament, the United States will be chiefly responsible for the failure
of the West to make itself the protagonist of peace.
The relations of the West with the rest of the world's peoples
-and, especially the peoples of the unaligned nations-will be
affected not only by the degree of Western cooperation in pro-

* Dated August 11, 1956, published in the N. Y. Times of August 14.

CHAPTERTHREE.
THE NEEDED REORGANIZATION OF THE WEST.
I. THE LACK OF WESTERN SOLIDARITY
No matter how greatly we may wish that we could "go it
alone9'-and this desire is strong in many Americans--our destiny
is inextricably intertwined with that of those nations which share
with us the heritage of Western civilization. Together we must
succeed or fail in meeting the challenge of a world in revolution.
The most glaring weakness of this group of Western nations
is that it lacks inner cohesiveness, organization, a sense of common interest and a clearly defined common purpose.
Insofar as there is any Western policy, it is not shaped by
consultation among the component parts of the Western community. It is dominated by three nations: the United States,
Great Britain and France, with Canada occasionally in the useful
role of mediator and the Federal Republic of Germany exerting
an increasingly unpredictable influence.
The dominant Big Three have what might euphemistically be
called a common policy as to Europe. They have not even the
semblance of a common policy with respect to Asia, Africa, or
the Middle East. Great Britain maintains touch with the members of the British Commonwealth, but neither the United States
nor the Big Three as such ever think of drawing the Latin
American republics into consultation as to Western policy, except
where Latin American interests are directly concerned or when
Latin American votes are wanted in the United Nations.
Let us pause on this subject a moment.

The sole organizational link between Latin America and the
North Atlantic Community is via the membership of the United
States in both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in
the Organization of American States. The consequence of
Western neglect of Latin American interests and susceptibilities
is a growing Latin American sympathy toward nonoWestern
nations and a growing lack of sympathy with Anglo-FrenchAmerican leadership.
It is important for many reasons to draw Latin America into
full and equal partnership with the North Atlantic nations.
The 20 Latin American republics are inhabited by
162,000,000 peoples, estimated to be the world's most rapidly

growing population group. African Negroes and aboriginal Indians
form a large part of this population; in some countries they are in
the majority. Only if Latin America is fully integrated in a Western
organization can the West justly maintain that it is not " a white
man's club". This is of crucial importance in shaping future Western relations with the peoples of Asia, Africa and the Middle
East.
Compared to the peoples of the North Atlantic basin, Latin
Americans as a whole live at an extremely low level of income,
health and education. In some countries, illiteracy runs as high
as 80%. In many, life expectancy is not much over 30 years.
Per capita annual income runs from about $400 in the Argentine,
Uruguay and Cuba to less than $100 in much of Central America.
Throughout most of the area, there is a wide gap between the few
rich families and the multitudes of the extremely poor. Only if
the Latin American nations become full and equal partners in an
effectively functioning Western organization, can the West deny
that it is "a rich man's club". This, too, is vitally important in
shaping Western relations with the non-Western "have not"
peoples.
Apart from these considerations, the raw material wealth of
Latin America and its potential as a market for manufactured
goods make it essential to North American and West European
prosperity, especially to the maintenance of a high living standard
in the United States.
Geographically and culturally, the Latin American republics
belong to the West but their adherence to the West can by no
means be taken for granted. Like the newly independent peoples
of Asia and Africa, the Latin Americans are trying to catch up
fast to the industrial and technological revolutions. They are seeking to achieve in a few years the economic status of Europe and
North America, without having either the experience or the capital
accumulated by Europe and North America during a century or
more of slow development. Like the emerging peoples of Asia
and Africa, the Latin Americans will take help where they can
get it. If they fail to obtain it from the more developed members
of the Western community, they will turn elsewhere and, in the
end, cease to be members of that community. If, on the other
hand, they are treated with respect and fairness by the West, they
will bring to the Western community not only a wealth of natural
resources but a vitally needed expanding economic frontier. Latin
America can mean to the Western community of nations what
our own West has meant to the development of the United States.

Taken as a whole, Latin America needs more and better
technical assistance, more public and private capital investment,
and a stabilization of the prices of the raw materials upon the
export of which its economic life depends. Beyond these practical requirements, Latin America needs to be brought into the
West on terms of equality, not as the younger brother of the
United States but as a full-fledged partner in the Western community. I£ this is not done soon, the Latin American republics
may well drift, if not toward Moscow, toward alignment with the
unaligned Bandung nations.

THE DISINTEGRATION
OF THE
ATLANTICCOMMUNITY
The only part of the West that is in any sense organized
is the so-called North Atlantic Community. The United States
and Canada are linked to some but not to all of the nations of
western and southern Europe in a military alliance (NATO).
Most, but not all of the West European nations are loosely associated in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC) and even more loosely joined in the Council of Europe.
France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries are rather
more closely united in the European Coal and Steel Community
which may shortly be expanded to cover atomic energy as well.
Western Europe's efforts to unite politically and economically
have been frustrated by a number of obstacles, among which
historic jealousies, prejudices and antipathies are the most obvious
but probably not the most important. The real obstacles have
been: 1) British unwillingness to join in any sort of political or
economic integration; 2) French fear of being overpowered by
Germany in an organization in which Britain does not provide a
counterbalance; 3) the continuing partition of Germany and 4)
the partition of what was once a natural all-European trading
community.
The key to this dilemma is the British position. The British
say that they cannot accept any close political or economic ties to
Western Europe without jeopardizing both their Commonwealth
relationships and their alliance with the United States. This contention is, I believe, only partly valid.
So far as Commonwealth ties are concerned, Canada has for
some time been urging the mother country to take the lead in
creating a strong West European entity. To my knowledge, there
have been no objections by Australia and New Zealand. Britain's
ties to the remaining members of the Commonwealth are now so
loose that it is d3Ecult to see how they would be adversely affected.
NORTH

As for the Anglo-American alliance, the United States has
consistently urged European integration, though it has refrained
from exerting the same sort of pressure upon Britain that it has
at times brought to bear upon the Continental nations.
One is led to suspect that the real obstacle lies in Britain's
desire to maintain a special position vis-a-vis the United States-a
position senior to that of the Continental countries. This is completely understandable, but it would seem selfevident to most
Americans that Anglo-American relations, no matter what the
strains put upon them, will always be more intimate and more
firmly knit than American relations with any other country except
Canada.
The answer lies in reorganizing the West as a whole. AngloAmerican relations are not strained by Britain's ties to Europe,
nor would they be strained if these bonds were to be strengthened.
Anglo-American relations are strained by the absence of a common
policy, especially in Asia and the Middle East.
The West is doomed unless it adopts a common policy to
insure its survival. There is no way to form a common policy
except by consultation, compromise and eventual agreement
among the sovereign nation-states. If France is going to reject
consultation about North Africa, if Great Britain is going to say
that Cyprus is strictly a British affair, and if the United States is
going to resent interference with its policy in the Far East, then
there can be no Western solidarity. Until Western solidarity is
achieved, the West will remain a prey to the "divide and conquer"
diplomacy of the Kremlin.
Let me make quite clear that I am not talking about an
organic federation of the Western nations, nor about any form of
closely knit political union. The component parts of "the West"
are too different and too widely separate to make union feasible.
Western Europe can federate, if the obstacles already discussed can
be overcome. Latin America could perhaps some day form a
United States of Latin America. It is conceivable, though unlikely,
that Great Britain, Canada and the United States might form an
organic union. But even if these rather remote possibilities were
realized, it would still remain to create a common policy for the
three Western federations.
For the purpose of meeting the immediate challenge, the
integration of the West need go no farther than the creation of a
Council in which common policy toward the non-Western world
is thrashed out and agreed upon. This is the maximum of the
presently attainable. It is likewise the minimum required for the
u ~ v a lof Western civilization-assuming that any form of
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civilization can be expected to survive for long without the abolition of war through universal, effectively enforced disarmament.
At the present time, the NATO military alliance forms the
chief organizational link between Great Britain and Wester o
Europe on one side of the Atlantic and the United States and
Canada on the other. The rapidly declining morale of this organization belatedly caused the Western leaders to realize in the spring
of 1956, that "something had to be done". It was perhaps an
encouraging sign that the committee of three, appointed in May
by the NATO Council to decide what should be done, did not,
for once, consist of the representatives of Great Britain, France
and the United States. Instead, the study group was composed
of the foreign ministers of Canada, Norway and Italy.

lI. WHAT CAN BE DONE? A PROPOSAL
The writer ventured to submit to the chairman of this study
group, Canada's Secretary for External Affairs Lester BePearson,
an analysis of NATO's trouble and a proposal for breathing new
life into the North Atlantic Community.* Its essence was the
following:
-

The decline of NATO morale was attributed to three major
causes :
First: The shift in Soviet tactics and the apparent diminution
of the danger of military attack had created a certain apathy if not
a sense of greater security among the peoples of Western Europe,
dissolving the temporary solidarity inspired by common fear.

Second: The belated comprehension of what would happen
to Europe in any war fought with atomic weapons, irrespective of
its outcome, had raised grave doubts in European minds as to
the defensive or deterrent value of maintaining at great cost
the contingents of conventional forces required under the NATO
alliance.

Third: The decision to re-arm West Germany as a partner
in NATO had caused a wide-open cleavage in European opinion,
,
one segment of which then and there became permanently . -,
3.
alienated. This applied not only to the European peoples
who
had suffered at German hands but to the ~ e - m a n sthemselves;:. ur
I

'.

-

..
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German opposition to NATO membership had steadily mounted
because of the increasingly evident bankruptcy of a DullesAdenauer policy which sought to force from Russia what amounted
to an unconditional surrender with respect to the terms of an allGerman peace settlement.
This analysis led the writer to the conclusion, that, if NATO
was to survive as a military alliance, its strategic concepts would
have to be drastically revised and its policy with respect to
Germany radically altered. It was suggested that the point of
departure for such a revision should be Western sponsorship of
the military neutralization of a reunified Germany on terms which,
while excluding Germany from NATO, would not prevent its
becoming a full-fledged member of the Atlantic Community in
every sense other than that of a military alliance. It was pointed
out that, in these circumstances, Gemany would not become a
political vacuum, cut loose from its Western moorings. *
Beyond a revision of NATO, however, the writer's analysis
of the Atlantic Community problem led to an additional and
more far-reaching conclusion. This was that NATO, while necessary in the continued absence of disarmament, was actually not
the instrument through which Western solidarity could or should
be revitalized.
It was suggested that, if the West were to regain its inner
unity and to recapture the moral leadership of the world, it would
have to present itself to the world in a garb other than that of
a military alliance. It was pointed out that we, of the West,
rightly think of the Atlantic Basin as the breeding ground of freedom, but that we tend to forget that, in the eyes of many of the
world's peoples, the Atlantic Community is also the cradle of
colonialism and the breeding ground of many wars. Therefore,
it was held to be neither fitting nor expedient for the vital qnter
of Western civilization to stand embodied before the world in a
military orgadzation-especially a military organization dominated
by three nations of which two have been and still are the world's
greatest colonial powers.
The writer then put forward the view that, in order to revitalize itself and its influence, the West should organize and be

* This proposal was previously submitted in some detail to President
Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles in December, 1952, before the
Republican administration took office. It was later published in a pamphlet,
France, Germany and NATO (Current Affairs Press, 1953) and elaborated
in Germany, Key to Peace (Harvard University Press, 1953.) The idea of
military neutralization, at first unpopular in Germany, has now gained
wide support and may be the decisive issue in the 1957 West German
elections.

represented by an entity which would be recognized by all the
world's peoples as an instrument of progress toward greater
freedom, human betterment and lasting peace. This, it was
argued, could not be accomplished by giving NATO new jobs
to do or by creating a "cabinet" charged with the consideration
of political and economic problems, as suggested by Secretary
D d e s last May. It could be accomplished only by bringing into
being a wholly new, non-military Western Council.
What would be the functions of this new embodiment of the
Western heritage?
It would concern itself, first of all, with developing the
political, social and economic solidarity of the Western Community.
It would seek to develop a common Western policy with respect
to other parts of the world, especially with regard to the peoples
emerging or seeking to emerge into national independence. It
would speak for the West in dealings with the Sino-Soviet orbit,
instead of leaving such negotiations to be conducted by the American, British and French foreign ministers.
The new Council's chief aims in such negotiations with
Moscow and Peking would be to reach local peace settlements
and an overall disarmament agreement effectively enforced by the
United Nations. With these aims achieved, the Council would
have accomplished its major purpose and could then dissolve into
a fully functioning world organization.
Since membership in the new Western organization would
involve no military commitments whatever, it is conceivable
that even such determined European neutrals as Sweden and
Switzerland might be willing to join, along with a militarily
neutralized Germany. Should Russia reject the proposal as to
Germany's military neutralization and subsequent membership in
the new, nonmilitary Western Council, the West could still proceed to admit West Germany, releasing it from NATO and thus
placing the onus for continued partition squarely upon the Kremlin.
Were this suggestion to be adopted, the instrumentality would
have been created by which could be achieved not only a broader
and more effective unity of the North Atlantic nations but a drawing
into full-fledged partnership of the Latin American republics. It
would remain to be seen whether the two "Western" nations of the
antipodes, Australia and New Zealand, would prefer to join the
Council or to co-operate with it via their Commonwealth relationship.
It may be thought that so large a deliberative body would
become unwieldy. That danger, of course, exists in any organiza-

tion founded upon the principles of democratic representation.
In all probability, the full membership of the Western Council
would annually elect a smaller executive body, giving appropriate
regional representation to the component parts of the Western
community. It might well be that such an executive body would
remain in continuous session, calling the full Council to make final
decisions but preparing the groundwork for such action.
The crucial question concerns quality rather than quantity.
The proposed Council can be effective only if its members send
their best qualified statesmen as representatives. One might suppose that, in many cases, these might be the same men who
represent the Western nations at the United Nations, especially if
the Council were to choose a site in or near the United Nations
establishment.

DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON POLICY.
The suggested organization of a Western Council would
create the instrumentality through which a common Western
policy might be developed, but this alone would not assure the
formation of such a policy. More is needed than the creation of
a forum for intra-Western discussion and debate. There must
come into being a common determination that full discussion shall
lead to whatever compromises are necessary in order to reach
agreement, at the very least in four major areas.
The West must, first of all, establish a common policy with
regard to its own heartland; that is to say, with regard to the kind
of peace settlement it seeks in Europe. Until this is done, it will
be difficult to reach agreement on a common policy concerning
other areas, if only because European interests extend into so
many parts of the nonoWestern world.
Second: the West must formulate a common policy with
respect to the hostile communist dictatorships.
Third: there must be agreement upon a policy toward the
nations which remain uncommitted in the stmggle between the
West and the communist dictatorships.
Fourth-and, in the long run,perhaps most important of all
-the Western nations must agree upon a common policy with
respect to the dependent or semi-dependent peoples seeking independence.
The greatest single obstacle to the development of a common
Western policy in any of these areas is an outworn concept of
national sovereignty. In spite of the growing interdependence of
nation-states and the indivisibility of survival, the idea persists that
it is the exclusive prerogative of national governments each to
pursue by its chosen means whatever it conceives to be its particular national interest. The greater and more powerful a nationstate, the more its government seems to cling to its sovereign prerogatives, resenting external interference with its policies and
actions. Yet the truth is that the national interest of every Westem nation demands the curtailment of sovereign rights in the interest of solidarity and survival.

I. TOWARD A EUROPEAN PEACE SETTLEMENT . - ,
The avowed aim of the Western powers is to move Russia
back out of eastern Europe to its own borders and to "liberate"
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the satellites. In some respects, this is an unrealistic aim;in others,
it may be attainable.
It is unrealistic to aim at the restoration of the Europe which
existed prior to 1938. The West's betrayal of Czechoslovakia
severed the ties which had bound central and eastern Europe to
France and Britain, leaving Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria a prey to Hitler and, after Hitler's
downfall, to the tender mercies of Josef Stalin. The consequences
of "appeasement", of fighting World War I1 with no other aim than
the quick attainment of "unconditional surrender" and of ten years
of Soviet domination in eastern Europe cannot be undone. Even
if freed from Soviet overlordship, the East European nations will
never revert to their pre-war status. They will never again become
merely the food and raw material supplying hinterland of industrialized western Europe. Their economic foundations and their
social structures have changed. Even with all restraints removed,
some of these countries may well prefer to remain politically and
economically oriented toward the Soviet Union. Some of them may
even wish to remain "communist" in the sense in which Tito's
Yugoslavia has remained communist. Some may wish to become
"democracies" to the extent of reestablishing free elections, two
or more political parties and parliamentary rule, but it seems more
likely that these countries will become socialist rather than capitalist
democracies, if only because of the nonexistence of any private
capital.
On the other hand, it is not unrealistic for the West to aim at
bringing about a retreat of Soviet coercive power in order to
restore freedom of choice to the East European peoples. In this
sense, the Western .aim may be attainable.
A German peace settlement along the lines already indicated
would be the most promising first step in this direction. The free
ing of 17,000,000 East Germans from Soviet domination is certainly the only presently practical step toward "liberation".
Unquestionably, the reaching of an all-German peace settlement is now very much more difficult than it would have been
before West Germany was committed to rearm and to join the
NATO alliance. Until 1950, German reunification could probably
have been had at the price of continued demilitarization and
neutralization. At that time, when the H bomb did not yet exist
and when the Russians saw a real threat in the resurgence of a
conventional German army, Germany might have been reunited,
neutralized and left free to decide for itself to what extent, if any,
the "socialist gains and reforms" in East Germany should be
Forty-six
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retained. Today it seems likely that at least some concessions in
this direction will have to be made, not only because the obvious
bankruptcy of Western policy has raised the Soviet price for reunihcation, but because the passage of time has more deeply imbedded
the social and economic changes imposed by the communist East
German regime. The probably necessary concessions-such as
accepting as permanent the socialization of certain industries and
the breaking up of the large landed estates-may be less painful
for the Germans than for the Western devotees of free enterprise
capitalism. This would certainly be true, if the Social Democrats
should come to power in the 1957 West German elections.
In any case, it is clear, that a German settlement negotiated
with Russia by the Western powers is far more likely to lead to
further progress in reuniting ~ u r o $ ethan an all-German settle
ment negotiated with Russia by the Germans. It is also clear that,
if the West does not soon offer to release West Germany from
NATO and move to seek a settlement on the basis of neutralization, the Germans will take matters into their own hands.*
The question may be raised whether a neutralized Germany
would not become a dangerously strong commercial competitor,
particularly for a Britain heavily dependent upon export of manufactured goods. This fear might be well grounded if a neutralized
Germany were to choose to remain disarmed, as might well have
been the case five years ago. Such a choice on the part of the
Germans is now extremely unlikely. There is, however, an even
stronger reason for not taking this threat too seriously; namely,
that if Geimany is reuliified, the burdens incident to rehabilitating
the Soviet zone and of bringing the East German living standard
up to parity with that existing in the Federal Republic will be
extremely onerous. (This, as a matter of fact, is why so many
prosperous West Germans have shown only a lip-service interest
in reunification.)
Assuming that the Western powers and the Soviet Union
could agree on the reunification and military neutralization of
Germany, the next step would be to seek the creation of the broadest possible militarily neutralized belt between the mutually hostile
camps.

* Warnings against precisely this danger were expressed by the writer in:
Rearming Germany-How Stupid Can We Be? (Current Mairs Press,
1949),; France, Germany and NATO (Current AfEairs Press, 1953); Germany-Key to Peace, (Harvard University Press, 1953) ; Turning Point
Toward Peace, Chapter 11 (Current Maim Press, 1955). Also in many
magazine articles and letters to the editor published in various leading
newspapers.

Austria is already neutralized. Switzerland is traditionally
neutral. Yugoslavia has assumed what appears to be a more or
less permanent attitude of neutrality. If a united Germany were
neutralized, there would have been created the beginning of a
neutralized belt stretching from the North Sea to the Adriatic.
This belt might later be expanded by the neutralization of other
countries in both East and West Europe, as for example, Czechoslovakia and Denmark.
Let me emphasize once more that military neutralization
does not mean political and economic neutralization. It involves
no change in existing political and economic orientations. It
does involve the withdrawal of both Russian and Western forces
from the neutralized countries and a mutual guarantee to respect
their neutrality. It should eventually involve the reduction of
the military establishments maintained by the neutralized nations.
The creation of a neutralized belt across Europe would not
alter the Continent's fate in the event of World War 111. Nothing
would. But the creation of such a belt would definitely reduce the
risk of that catastrophe's occurring.
Would Russia agree to any such proposal? There is only one
way to find out and that is to put it forward. What we know
for certain is that the present Western policy with respect to
Germany is bankrupt and that, if we continue to adhere to it,
we shall very likely lose Germany altogether and, with it, all
control over the fate of Europe. On the other hand, if the West
were to make such a proposal and Russia rejected it, the West
would be reasonably sure of retaining the moral allegiance of
the German people and of gaining in worldwide respect.
It is perhaps well to anticipate here two questions likely to
occur to the reader:
1. How could the West station enough troops west of a
neutralized Germany in order to be able to defend the remainder

of Western Europe?
Answer: With or without a rearmed West Germany, Western
Europe is indefensible. In a war fought with nuclear weapons,
Western Europe would be destroyed. The assumption that World
War 111 would be fought without the use of nuclear weapons is
refuted by the known plans of the NATO command. The idea
that only "tactical" atomic weapons might be used has been
dissected in a previous chapter.

.2. What about the "plate glass window theory9'-the idea
that we must keep at least some ground forces where they would
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have to be overrun by the first Russian advance into Western
Europe.
Answer: If that theory has any validity in the atomic age, it
would be perfectly possible to adapt it to the proposal here put
forward. It could be agreed that the Western powers would
keep a limited number of troops along the eastern frontier of
the neutralized belt while the Russians would maintain a similar
contingent along its western border. A similar idea applied only
to radar screens was suggested by a French general in 1954.
Better still, two United Nations task forces could take over
the plate glass window function.

TOWARD RED CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION
If there is to be a common Western policy in dealing with
the two great communist dictatorships, the United States will have
to make some major concessions unpalatable to a great many
Americans. This is especially true with respect to the Chinese
People's Republic.
Among the Western nations, the United States stands alone
in its refusal to accept the fact that the Peking regime is
established as the effective government of a nation containing
almost onequarter of the world's population. The United States
stands alone in supporting the Chinese Nationalists' hope of returning to power, though not in supporting the legitimacy of Nationalist rule over Taiwan (Formosa). The United States finds itself more
and more isolated in its diplomatic and economic boycott of the
Chinese People's Republic and in its determination to deny the
Peking government admission to the United Nations. Finally,
the deliberately ambiguous attitude of the American government
toward the rightful ownership and defense of the Chinese off-shore
islands has kept the United States at the brink of a war with
the Chinese People's Republic-a war which might well endanger
the security of the entire world.
There are obvious reasons why American hostility toward the
Chinese Communists is greater than that of the other Western
nations. Only the United States became involved in the Chinese
civil war and, hence, entangled in an alliance with the Nationalists
after their defeat. The United States bore the brunt of the
fighting in Korea and suffered the greatest number of casualties
at Chinese hands.
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The fact remains, however, that the resulting position of the
United States with respect to China has become unrealistic, untenable and a road-block to Western solidarity, as well as an obstacle
to the achievement of any reasonable settlement of outstanding
issues in the Far East. Moreover, in this writer's opinion, more
fully expressed elsewhere,* present American policy with respect
to China is self-defeating and contrary to the best interests of
the American people.
(The United States is also increasingly isolated from the
other Western nations by its present attitude toward India and
Japan, but the formation of a common Western policy toward
these two crucially important Asian nations can be more appropriately discussed under the heading of Western policy toward
the unaligned nations.)
While, with respect to Communist China, it is our dexibility
that stands in the way of Western unity, it is our contrasting indecision that confuses our allies and obstructs the formation of a
common policy toward the Soviet Union. This indecision is
natural enough but nonetheless dangerous. No one really knows
what has been happening in Russia since the death of Josef Stalin.
Even less can anyone foretell future developments.
The reaffirmation by Nikita Khrushchev of the belief in the
eventual triumph of communism means no more than did the
declaration by Moslem leaders, centuries ago, that Islam would
conquer the world. When Islam and Christianity eventually
reached a stalemate, the Moslem and the Christian dreams of
supremacy were each forgotten. So it was with Napoleon's dream
and Hitler's vision of a "thousand year Reich". And so it will
probably be with all dreams of world conquest so long as there
remains a world to conquer.
What matters is not whether the Russians have changed their
ultimate objective but whether and, if so, why they have changed
their methods of approaching that objective. On this question
there have been within the American government two conflicting
interpretations. It is obvious to all that the Russians have changed
their tactics. The disagreement is over the question of what has
caused them to do so.
There is the view, at various times publicly expressed with
smug satisfaction by Secretary of State Dulles, that the recent
developments within Russia are a sign of weakness; that this
weakness is due to the "success" of Western policy; and that,

* Turning Point

Toward Peace, Chapter 12.

therefore, Western policy--especially the policy of the United
States-should remain essentially unchanged. But there is also
the contrary view, widely held abroad and also in some Washington circles, that Russia has made enormous strides in building
up her military and economic power; that the "smiling diplomacy"
of Bulganin and Khrushchev derives from a sense of strength and
a certainty of ultimate triumph; and that Russia is infinitely
more dangerous today than in the time of Stalin. This is what
Mr. Dulles has been saying on those occasions when he was
seeking Congressional appropriations; but, even in this less boastful
mood, Mr. Dulles has maintained that our present policy should
be continued.
Other men close to President Eisenhower have, on the other
hand, appeared to hold the belief that our policy should be changed
so as to encourage more negotiation, more cooperation and more
trade with the communist orbit. Uncertainty as to the nature of
the American defense forces to be maintained has added to the
confusion.
The whole dilemma has been aggravated by the illness of
President Eisenhower and the incidence of national elections. The
President's inability to give firm and continuous leadership has
been largely responsible for the stagnation of American policy,
while the approach of elections caused what amounted to a tacit
agreement on the part of lesser politicians to pigeon-hole all controversial and emotion-charged issues.
It is only fair to say that the divergent opinions of other
Western governments added to Washington's confusion. In June
1956, Chancellor Adenauer came to this country to plead earnestly
for the continuation of a tough, wholly distrustful and uncompromising policy. Like Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee, the
German Chancellor had so committed himself to the cold war that
he could see no possible alternative. Within a week, the French
foreign minister, Christian Pineau, arrived with a briefcase full of
arguments for a more conciliatory policy; Sir Anthony Eden
expressed similar sentiments in the British House of Commons,
holding that the time had come to explore carefully whether or not
the spectacular repudiation of Stalin had opened the door to better
relations with the Soviet government.
DXEcult as it may be for the Western leaders to reach firm
conclusions, the fact remains that nothing could be more dangerous to the West than the absence of a common policy toward each
of the two hostile communist dictatorships.
It is equally clear that Russia and Red China present two
wholly different problems. Russia has reached an advanced stage
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of industrial development and is consolidating rather than advancing her social revolution. China is in the early stages of industrialization and revolutionary change. Chinese and Russian interests
are by no means identical, nor are the causes of their hostility to
the West the same. Russia is essentially a competitor of the West.
China is a rebel against Western interference in her internal affairs
and an insurgent against white supremacy and non-Asian influence.
In dealing with Peking, the Western problem is, first of all,
to establish channels of negotiation and then to use them in settling
the outstanding differences over the offshore islands, Taiwan,
Korea and China's future relation to southeast Asia. If these
matters can be disposed of, there should remain very little conflict
of interest between China and the West. It is by no means fantastic
to expect that, in time, Western cooperation with China's develop
ment will be more natural and more mutually beneficial than
Sino-Soviet cooperation.
In dealing with Moscow, the Western problem consists of
using already established channels of communication to convert
explosively hostile competition into a safer and more constructive
form of rivalry. The over-riding objective must be the achievement of disarmament. First steps in that direction might well be
the banning of nuclear tests and experiments with the intercontinental missile, the achievement of a German settlement and the
creation of a neutral belt across Europe, along the lines already
suggested.

III. TOWARD THE UNALIGNED NATIONS
Western policy toward the uncommitted nations, which hold
the ultimate balance of power, is probably of greater long-run
importance than Western policy toward Moscow and Peking.
Until quite recently, the United States has been more and more
isolated from other Western nations by its harsh and uncompromising attitude, often expressed in the phrase: "If they're not with
us, they're against us." This somewhat primitive feeling has been
shared by few of the other Western governments.
During the summer of 1956, especially after the visit to
Washington of Indonesia's President Sukarno, the Americaxi policymaking group went through an apparently "agonizing" though
incomplete re-examination of this attitude. The second illness of
President Eisenhower and the consequent postponement of Indian
Prime Minister Nehru's scheduled visit, cut short deliberations
which might have resulted in a fruitful re-definition of policy by
the chief executive. As it was, the President made a preliminary
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statement during one of his press conferences, indicating both
understanding and sympathy for the attitude of the so-called
neutralist nations of Asia. The President recalled that the United
States itself had, during its early years of independence, pursued
a policy of neutrality and expressed understanding for the fact that
participation in military alliances involved a certain amount of
danger.
This statement caused a furor among the advocates of intransigence. The ambassador of Pakistan called at the State Department to ask for an explanation. Chancellor Adenauer instituted
similar enquiries. The White House secretariat came forward with
a somewhat ambiguous supplementary statement. It remained for
Secretary D d e s to jerk the rudder back completely from the new
course set by the President. In a carefully prepared speech
delivered at Iowa State University on June 9, the Secretary
declared that neutrality was obsolete and that "except in exceptional cases it is an immoral and short-sighted conception".
Now the clamor arose in New Delhi, Rangoon and Jakarta.
As usual, whenever President Eisenhower's impromptu utterances
revealed the essential fairness of his conceptions, his natural trust
in human decency and his deep desire for peace, his Secretary of
State managed to convey the opposite impression. The picture
given to the world has been one of an administration divided
within itself, with the President representing the liberal wing of
both the Republican and Democratic parties and his Secretary of
State acting as the spokesman of the ultra-nationalist intransigents.
(Actually, John Foster Dulles is far from being an ultra-nationalist,
but his concern, as Secretary of State, has unfortunately been more
with domestic politics than with statesmanship.)
The absence of a common Western policy with respect to the
unaligned nations has played directly into the hands of the Kremlin.
It has enabled the Soviet leaders to woo the uncommitted peoples
by speaking constantly of the "peace bloc of the socialist countries" as opposed to the "war bloc which the United States is seeking to expand by drawing nation after nation into military
alliances". This has been particularly effective in Asia.
The effect of the American initiative in organizing the Southeast Asian counterpart to NATO-the
Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO)-has been especially disastrous. By
re-arming Pakistan and drawing it into military alliance with the
Western powers, the United States not only alienated India, Burma
and Ceylon but upset the balance of power as between Pakistan
and Afghanistan as well as the balance between Pakistan and India.
Instead of creating a cordon of military strength against the expanFifty-three

sion of the communist orbit, SEATO-by alienating Afghanistanhas opened to the Soviet Union the door to the Khyber Pass; and
r%y
alienating India, Burma and Ceylon, SEAT0 has made these
countries susceptible to communist propaganda, backed by offers
of economic aid.
One of the top items on any agenda for formulating a, common Western policy in Asia 'should be the replacement of this
self-defeating military alliance by an enlarged and invigorated
Colombo Plan, or by a new regional organization designed solely
to promote economic development.
The key to the Asian future lies in India. I suspect that the
key to a safer and more tolerable coexistence between the rival
power blocs also lies in the use of India as a mediator.
Japan, too, is of great importance to the Asian future. Here
again, an American policy, concerning which the other Western
powers entertain grave misgivings, obstructs progress toward Westem unity. Japan wants to be a friend of the West, but Japan lives
and must live in and with Asia. American insistence upon Japanese
rearmament, American occupation (for air bases) of badly needed
Japanese farm land, American-imposed restrictions on trading with
China, and American disregard of Japanese pleas to discontinue
testing nuclear weapons are rapidly alienating Japanese sentiment.*
So far as Asia is concerned, the problem of formulating and
putting in& effect a common Western policy consists very largely
in changing existing American policy. This is not to say that
Britain, France, Holland and Portugal have not made their share
of mistakes in Asia, but these mistakes have had to do chiefly with
liquidating the colonial past, whereas the American mistakes in
Asia have had to do with misjudging the present and the future.

IV. TOWARD THE EMERGING PEOPLES
The problem of forming a common Western policy with
respect to the peoples emerging or seeking to emerge into independence overlaps the problem of dealing with the uncommitted
nations. Most of the nations which have recently gained their
independence are uncommitted, and most of the peoples seeking
national independence are likely to join the bloc of the unaligned.
Nevertheless, the two problems are not identical and, of the two,
that posed by the struggle between the emerging peoples and the
colonial powers is by far the most difficult to solve.

* 30,000,000 Japanese signed a petition to the United States to abandon
nuclear tests at Eniwetok.
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Having led the way in breaking free from European colonial
domination and having set the example of liberating the Philippines,
the United States should by rights have been the one great Western
nation capable of moderating both the hyperfervid haste of some
of the dependent peoples and the stubborn retentiveness of some
of the colonial powers. Far from playing a constructive part in
this c o a c t , the United States has actually sharpened it by injecting into it the almost wholly extraneous American obsession with
the cold war against communism.
When it comes to denouncing neutralism as "immoral and
short-sighted", Secretary Ddles should realize that the nation for
which he speaks is living in a glass house. Neutralism is precisely
what the American government has practiced with respect to a
conflict no less important than the struggle between the communist
dictatorships and the anti-communist coalition.
If ever there was a clearly predictable disaster, it is that which
has overtaken the French in North Africa. Yet, so great was the
American government's preoccupation with preserving its communistencircling bases that even the tragic lesson of IndoChina
failed to drive home the futility of backing French efforts to suppress colonial revolt by force. Had the United States brought to
bear upon France only a fraction of the pressure which it exerted
in behalf of accepting German rearmament, it might have persuaded the French to mobify their North African policy in time
to avert a second disaster.
The same sort of wavering neutralism has characterized our
government's attitude toward the Arab revolt against British overlordship in the Middle East. First, in 1953, Secretary Dulles
adopted a pro-Arab policy. Then having urged the British to
evacuate Suez, Secretary DulIes sponsored the one idea predictably
certain to make Egypt hostile to the West in spite of British withdrawal; namely, the notion-born of cold war considerationsto link Iraq, Egypt's rival for Arab leadership, into an alliance
with Britain, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The arming of Iraq led
Egypt to seek arms from Russia and this, in turn, brought Russia
into the Middle East and Egypt and Israel to the brink of war.
Having fathered the ill-fated Baghdad Pact, Mr. Dulles could think
of nothing better than to stand aloof from its fatal consequences.
Throughout the ensuing period of many-sided tension, the American State Department tried to be friends with everyone and succeeded only in antagonizing the British, the French, the Israelis,
the Arabs and, finally, the Egyptians.
The crisis over the Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal was
the direct result of Secretary Dulles' wavering Middle East policy.
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When the fiasco of the Baghdad Pact resulted in Egypt's turning
to Russia for arms, Mr. Dulles made frantic efforts to forestall
further Soviet penetration by hastening American aid to Egypt in
building the Aswan high dam. Yet, when it became apparent
that the Kremlin was in no hurry to outbid the United States in
financing the Aswan project, Mr. Dulles suddenly reversed his
policy and abruptly withdrew the American offer, justifying his
action by a statement which would have offended even a less sensitive government than that of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. It
was scarcely surprising that the hot-headed, ambitious and ruthless
Egyptian leader should react by seizing and nationalizing the Suez
Canal.
Nor was it surprising that the British and French governments
should, for the moment, lose their heads over the Egyptian seizure
and unwisely threaten military action. French resentment against
Nasser was at fever pitch because of his backing the Arab revolt
in North Africa. British resentment was aroused less by the act
of nationalizing the Canal than by the possibility that the Egyptian
dictator might some day close the vital waterway in spite of his
assurances to the contrary. The British demand for international control was explicitly based upon distrust of Nasser.
The weakness of the Western position, however, was that the
Western powers had for over a year winked at Nasser's refusal to
pennit Israeli ships to use the waterway, and that they themselves
had in time of war closed the Canal to enemy vessels although the
treaty of 1888 expressly provided that it should be open to ships
of all nations "in time of war as well as in time of peace."
When the crisis broke out in August, 1956, American efforts
were sensibly directed toward peaceful settlement; but, instead of
bringing the matter before the United Nations, the Western powers
attempted to settle the matter by a conference of 24 somewhat
curiously selected "interested nations." Out of consideration for
Egyptian sensibilities, Israel-a very vitally interested nationwas not invited to attend. At the same time, British military
preparations against Egypt went on in the full glare of publicity.
As might be expected, Egypt refused to attend and made it clear
that, while she might agree to some form of international consultation concerning the operation of the Suez Canal, she would not be
coerced into accepting international control inconsistent with her
sovereignty. Thus the West seemed headed for another major
defeat.
Granted that there never was any easy solution to the problems
of the Middle East and that even a wiser Western policy might
not have been w M y successful, it surely must be apparent that
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it was a fatal mistake to rearm the Arab states and to attempt
the formation of a Northern Tier Alliance. This is not hindsight
on my part. A year ago,* I made these two observations:
Arming an area against a danger which
threatens it can be effective only if its inhabitants
recognize that the danger exists and wish to defend
themselves against it. With the exception of the
Turks, who have a long tradition of hostility toward
Russia and an active desire to defend themselves
against Soviet aggression, most of the peoples of
the Moslem crescent are more concerned with
shaking off the remnants of European colonialism
than with fending off possible communist encroachment. . . . They are more conscious of American
bomber bases and British military installations on
their soil than of the Red Army lurking behind the
mountains of the Caucasus.
A second consideration is that arming nations
which have outstanding disputes with their neighbors
--especially boundary disputes such as exist between
India and Pakistan and, in more explosive form,
between Israel and the Arab states-is more likely
to lead to war than to peaceful settlements.
Like SEAT0 in Asia, the Baghdad Pact is a source of trouble
to be liquidated as quickly and as gracefully as possible. Like
SEATO, it should be replaced by a regional organization for
economic development.
The formation of a common Western policy aiming at the
gradual emancipation of all the dependent peoples requires more
than hand-wringing abstention or wavering intervention on the
part of the United States. So far, Britain, the greatest but also
the wisest of the colonial powers, has made a greater contribution than the United States to the solution of the colonial problem.
Not that Britain has solved all its difficulties, but Britain has
shown the world how an empire could be turned into a commonwealth of free nations and how its colonies could peacefully
emerge either into voluntary membership in that commonwealth
or into complete national independence. Yet even Britain faces
problems which cannot be solved by any ghb formula, as witness
Cyprus, Malta and Singapore. Nor can Britain afford to deal
with the nationalist revolt in the oil-rich countries of the Middle
East without considering her own precarious financial position.

* Turning Point Toward Peace, page 54.

As for France, whatever one may think of past French
colonial policy,* it is a fact that France is now confronted with
an almost insoluble problem in Algeria, where over one million
Frenchmen have settled, many of them several generations ago.
The worldwide nationalist revolt of the dependent peoples
has created a situation which demands the understanding help
of not only the United States but of all the non-colonial nations.
This is where the Latin American republics could, if consulted,
be of great assistance. Most of the Latin American peoples,
while long since freed from colonial mle, nevertheless share
many of the Afro-Asian resentments and aspirations. They, too,
have been left behind by the technological revolution. They,
too, have been relegated to the role of second-class world citizens.
At the same time, their own experience tells them that the mere
attainment of national independence does not necessarily bring
with it equal status or equal opportunity for advancement. As full
and equal partners of the West, they could be the ideal mediators.

* My own views of French colonial policy, together with a prediction of
the trouble which has since developed, were stated in Turning Point Toward
Peace, Chapter 7 .

CONCLUSION.
I. THE PLACE TO BEGIN IS HERE AT HOME
The heavy emphasis placed upon American shortcomings
throughout the preceding discussion may well engender a certain
amount of resentment. The reader may be prompted to ask:
"Are we the only sinners? What about some of the other members of the Western commanity? And, above all, who produced
this crisis in world affairs?-Certainly not the United States".
Among the nations of the West, we are by no means the
only sinners, especially if one views the actions of the West
not just in the light of the present but in the perspective of, let
us say, the last half century. World War I was bred in Europe
and so were both communism and fascism. World War I1 was
bred by the entire Western community, plus Japan. Since World
War 11, the European nations have made their share of mistakes,
but the difference between their postwar mistakes and ours, as
I see it, is that theirs have been mistakes of unfamiliar and unexpected weakness while ours have been mistakes of unaccustomed
strength and unfamiliar responsibility.
As for "who caused the crisis in world affairs", it is true
that the communist dictatorships have done more than their
share, but by way of ruthlessly exploiting the crisis rather than
by contributing to its original causes. The communist dictatorships did not create the global revolution against poverty, nor
the Asian and Middle Eastern revolt against colonialism, nor did
they invent the weapons of race suicide. The communist dictatorships have fished in the troubled waters roiled up by two
great wars and the premature dawn of an age for which mankind was not ready. They have made the crisis infinitely more
dangerous and infinitely more difficult to solve than it would
have been, had it not been complicated by their brutal pursuit
of their own selfish ends. But, if the conlmunist dictatorships were
tomorrow to be overthrown, the basic elements of the crisis would
still be with us; we might have a little more time to meet its
problems, but we could not escape from meeting them.
The United States alone cannot, of course, save the world
from an atomic holocaust nor-if
humanity escapes from that
disaster---can the United States alone assure the survival of
Western civilization. But the point of this study is precisely
to show how great is the burden of unsought responsibility that
rests upon the American people and how much depends upon
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what the United States does or fails to do in the months and
years ahead.
Without our moral leadership, there can be no de-fusing of
the fearful weapons of mass murder which we have invented-no
firm establishment of lasting peace through the abolition of national
armaments.
Without our great economic strength, developed to its full
potential, the West will be powerless to prevent an almost worldwide dependence upon corntnunist aid for economic development.
Unless we modify many of our fixed ideas and frozen attitudes,
we shall be unable to supply moral leadership and our economic
strength will remain a latent and sterile asset.
The place to begin is here at home. Inevitably, our foreign
policy will reflect the "state of the Union" within our own
borders and the state of mind of the American people.
The "state of the Union" is, as I have tried to show, far
from being as strong and healthy as most of us seem to believe.
The state of mind of the American people is dangerously complacent and materialistic.
We cannot pursue an intelligent course of diplomacy, so long
as our statesmen remain obsessed by obsolete concepts of no longer
existent physical power, nor so long as our political leadership
lacks either the vision to see the true state of &airs or the courage
to tell the truth to the American people.
We cannot be the champions of freedom abroad, so long as
we continue to suppress freedom here at home or to deny its full
enjoyment to any part of our own population.
We cannot become intelligently liberal in our dealings with
other peoples, so long as we remain foolishly "conservative" in
meeting the economic and social needs of our own people. The
kind of "conservatism" which governs our national fiscal policy
does not conserve our nation's strength; it permits our assets to
waste away. Our children's and our grandchildren's future is being
impaired by lack of schoolrooms and teachers. Our land is being
eroded by drought and washed away by floods into the sea. Our
natural resources are being developed more for private profit than
for public good. This is not conservatism. It is irresponsible
waste, dictated by self-interest pressure groups and rationalized by
the book-keeping concepts of a bygone era.
There is a strange contradiction between our fiscal behavior
as a nation and our behavior as a people. Except for military
expenditures, our government regulates its budget on the parsimonious principles of a Puritan spinster. The aggregate of indi-

vidual American household budgets, on the other hand, would
show little evidence of self-reliant thrift and responsibility.
It seems to me that what we must do is to reverse these emphases: to be less "conse~ative"in our national fiscal policy and more
truly conservative in our individual balancing of expenditure
against income. At the same time, we must place enough restraint
upon our free enterprise capitalism to prevent it from wasting its
own strength.
This is no plea for wild public extravagance, nor for extreme
private austerity, nor for undue government interference with business. In the private sector of our economic life, it is a plea for
nothing more than the application of common sense. In the sector
of public policy, it is a plea for just enough government expenditure and governmental action to take care of the nation's most
obviously neglected needs, to clean out the pockets of depression
in our "prosperous" economy, to free our economy from dependence upon military expenditure, to stimulate more rapid growth
and adjustment-in other words, to transform the United States
from a complacent, status quo nation into a dynamic element in a
rapidly changing world.
As a status quo nation, incapable as we now are of using
physical force to prevent change, we are doomed to defeat by the
revolutionary forces at work in the world. Our only chance for
future greatness-if
not our only chance for survival-lies in
becoming once more, as we have been in the past, a leader of
revolutionary change. To accomplish this requires no departure
from the American tradition. It requires nothing more than the
resumption of our natural role-the role which has, in the past,
made us a great nation because we have attracted the allegiance
of a l l men everywhere seeking change for the better.

II. THE PREDICAMENT OF WESTERN MAN
The revitalization of the American spirit is of crucial importance, but the challenge we face must atso be seen in a broader
context. We are only a part of that segment of the human race
which, for want of a better term, is commonly referred to as
"Western Man."
By this term we mean that minority of the human family
which first spread from the Mediterranean Basin over most of
Europe mil then settled the two Americas and the antipodes,
establishing in these widely separated regions of the earth something of o common culture and civilization. It is this part of the
human race which has for several centuries dominated the course
Sixty-one

of world affairs and which now stands on trial before the aroused
masses of mankind.
Western Man acquired ascendancy chiefly because he developed and maintained a lead over the majority of mankind in
military and economic power. He has ruled because he first
emancipated himself from the shackles of a primitive agricultural
society, discovered the division of labor, learned how to manufacture, to trade, to accumulate capital and to achieve mobility
over land and sea. Thus he was able to acquire more and more
relative strength, knowledge and freedom. Thus he might have
been able to gain the respect and admiration of all mankind and
to establish a leadership based upon consent.
The fatal weaknesses of Western Man have been his insatiable
acquisitiveness and his inability to live at peace with himself. The
component parts of Western society did not unite in order to rule
the world in peace and justice. They quarreled endlessly over
their religious beliefs, their possessions and their opportunities for
self aggrandizement. They fought over the hegemony of Europe,
over the ownership and exploitation of newly discovered parts of
the world and, finally, over the domination of the world itself.
In the end, Western Man has a l l but destroyed the most
important foundations of his own ascendancy. Insofar as his
supremacy rested upon force of arms, he has developed the means
of destruction to the point at which armed force has become
meaningless. To the extent that his power was economic, he has
undermined it through endless fratricidal wars. Where his advantage derived fiom technological skill and knowledge not possessed
by others, his own inventions have eliminated time and distance
to such an extent that the maintenance of his monopoly became
impossible. Where he might have gained the respect and admiration of the less privileged majority of the human race, Western
Man has undermined his own prestige and influence by failing to
practice the principles which he preached or to live up to the
religions which he so ardently proselytized.
The present grave predicament of Western Man consists in
having to learn, and learn quickly, how to live in and with a world
which has forever escaped from his control. It consists in ha*
to learn, and learn quickly, how to survive in a world released
from ignorance and the coercion of that physical power by means
of which the underprivileged majority of the human race has
hitherto been restrained from seeking justice and equality.
If Western Man fails to come to terms with a world no longer
under his control, he is certain to be submerged by the global

revolution. If he succeeds, he may perhaps enter upon a new
phase in his long pilgrimage in which he will at long last discover
the secret of leadership by example and consent.
But that is not all. The crisis of Western Man is not merely
the crisis of waning power. It is also a moral crisis.
Western Man stands on trial before his own conscience and
before the conscience of mankind because he, more than his fellow
men, has violated the precept that it is wrong for man to kill except
in self-defense; Western Man has stretched the concept of selfdefense to the point of legitimizing the mass murder of wholly
innocent civilian populations. Most of the world's peoples have
at one time or another been guilty of armed aggression and of
cruelty in war, but it remained for Western Man to invent longrange artillery and to use it in the bombardment of open cities;
to invent the airplane and, from it, to drop high explosive or
incendiary bombs upon sleeping men, women and children; and,
finally, to create the inhuman instruments of race suicide.
Not once, since the birth of Christ, has Western Man produced a Gandhi. Western Man has spawned Torquemadas,
Napoleons, Hitlers and Statins. He has preached love and practiced hate.
Western civilization stands or falls upon the belief in the
dignity of man, in the equality of all men before God, and in the
equal rights of all men to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."
What dignity, what equality, what hope of life, liberty and
happiness can exist anywhere on this earth, until the destructive
forces released by Western Man are brought under moral as well
as physical control?
Western Man is standing upon the topmost rung of a shaky
ladder from which he is reaching for the very throne of God. If
he falls, the innocent masses of mankind will be destroyed in his
self-destrzlction. But if, at the last moment, Western Man saves
himself and the world from extinction, he will not only have to
learn how to adjust himself to radically altered circumstance; he
will also have to learn a new humility.
This, then, is the crisis of Western Man. In the Chinese
language, which is far older than our own, there is no word for
crisis. It is written with two characters, one meaning danger and
the other opportunity. That is what we face: Deadly danger and
almost unimaginable opportunity.
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Over 100,000copies have been distributed by educational, civic,
religibus, farm and labor organizations.
More than 20,000 dopies have been'sent out by members of
Congress to their constituents.
Here is what a member .of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said on the floor of the Senate when he asked znd obtained
un-ous
consent to have the entire text of Turning Point Toward
Peace included in the Congressional Record of April 16, 1956:
The leadership which Mr. Warburg is giving to a thorough
appraisal of American fore@ policy shows very clearly
that, irrespective of what the politicians do by way of
debating or not debating all phases of our foreign policy,
there is rising among our citizenry a tidal wave-of &cussion and debate.
One' of the outstanding leaders of this public discussion is
James Warburg of New York. He is recognized as a.keen
scholar of foreign affairs, a highly .respected economic conservative, and a very inteagent and patriotic critic of some
glad that
of the trends in American foreign pofiby. I
we have James Warburgs in America and
, AI .hope that their
numbers will'increase.
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If you have not yet read TURNING POINT TOWARD
PEACE, order your copy now. It will help you to grasp the full
signiiicance of its sequel, DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY.
(Price: 50 cents.)
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